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Preface
This set of papers results from participation by staff members of the Programme for Land
and Agrarian Studies in the eighth biennial conference of the International Association for the
Study of Common Property, held at Bloomington, Indiana, from 31 May to 4 June, 2000.
We are grateful to IASCP for accepting our proposal for a panel on Constituting the com-
mons in the new South Africa, at which these papers were presented. We are also grateful to
Dr James Murombedzi and the Ford Foundation for their role in stimulating and funding our
participation in the conference, and their support for work at PLAAS on community-based
natural resource management. However, we take full responsibility for any inadequacies in
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Figure 1: Location of research sites in South Africa.
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At the eighth biennial meeting of the Inter-
national Association for the Study of Com-
mon Property, the Programme for Land and
Agrarian Studies organised a panel on the
prospects and problems of the commons in
the new South Africa. Although the nations
indigenous heritage of common property
resource management was grossly distorted
and then mostly destroyed by the colonial
and apartheid experiences, it remains
important to assess the potential contribu-
tion of the commons as a framework for
livelihoods and a mode of resource govern-
ance. The IASCP panel debated these issues
and sought to identify the challenges and
opportunities facing common property
resource management in various sectors of
contemporary South Africa. Three of the
papers that were prepared for the panel are
presented here.
Moenieba Isaacs and Najma Mohamed
review co-management as a means of
governing natural resources and their users.
They argue that co-managing the commons
within the new governance structures of
South Africa has the potential to promote
participatory democracy and improve
natural resource management. Inequitable
access to and use of natural resources
characterised apartheid-era policies and
practices. In line with post-1990 democrati-
sation processes, public involvement, par-
ticipation, community-based initiatives and
co-management have been promoted as key
aspects of natural resource management
policies. Power sharing, empowerment,
organisational capacity building and im-
proved natural resource management are
some of the key principles of co-manage-
ment within the South African context. The
authors explore the applicability of the co-
management concept to the enhancement
of rural livelihoods in South Africa with
specific reference to the conservation
sector, and coastal and marine resources
policy and implementation processes. Co-
management initiatives in the fisheries and
conservation sectors in South Africa have
failed to incorporate many co-management
principles, such as joint decision-making and
benefit distribution. Instead, co-manage-
ment has been transformed from a commu-
nity-based management approach to a more
top-down approach. The visibility of market
liberalisation and privatisation trends in
South African natural resource policies
reflects the dominance of such thinking in
broader macro-economic policies. Thus, the
embeddedness of local initiatives within the
broader South African political economy
explains why co-management, in its present
form, provides little respite for the rural
poor. In reality, the action space created
by natural resource management policies for
community-based natural resource manage-
ment, is not being claimed by rural commu-
nities. A re-definition of co-management,
which addresses the realities of the frac-
tured rural communities of South Africa
within a liberalised political economy, is
required to develop natural resource man-
agement systems that address the injustices
of the past. Furthermore, co-management
concepts should be re-worked to assist in
the de-marginalisation of rural communi-
ties in South Africa.
Zolile Ntshona assesses governance options
for communal rangelands in an area of the
Eastern Cape that he has studied. He
explains how the democratic government
era has been characterised by poor manage-
ment of rangeland resources in most parts
of the rural South Africa.  With little fenc-
ing and the unavailability of herding labour,
Summary
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common property resource management is
becoming more difficult to implement in
communal areas. He looks at whether
common property resource management
approaches offer any sort of non-freehold
future for livestock production and range
management in communal areas of South
Africa.  People in communal areas de-
pended on government provisions and
assistance for more than 30 years during the
period of the  betterment programme.
After the collapse of the programme, grants
and policing by the government were dis-
continued, but people now still expect
grants and to be policed by the government.
The paper argues that the future will pro-
vide positive benefits if a different kind of
betterment can be implemented.  Pure
common property resource management by
local communities of resource managers
cannot be recreated. The state needs to play
a strong role in supporting local users
efforts.
In the third paper, Stephen Turner explores
the interfaces between nature conservation
and the commons in contemporary South
Africa. The history of nature conservation in
South Africa epitomises the colonial process
of alienating Africans from their land and
from their capacity to protect the environ-
ment. After decimating the countrys wild-
life, settlers then gave better treatment to
the remaining animals than to the indig-
enous human population, creating special
reserves for them and forcibly removing
Africans from these areas. Indigenous
sustainable use of wildlife was criminalised
as poaching. Whites then used the nature
reserves as recreation areas. These areas
remain a national asset in the new, demo-
cratic South Africa: a special kind of na-
tional commons from which little or no
resource extraction is permitted. Trying to
contain the discontent of the rural poor
living near (sometimes in) nature reserves,
conservation authorities now foster a special
feeling of ownership and economic benefit
among these park neighbours. This is not
always welcomed by still privileged, tax
paying urban people, jealous of their civic
right to enjoy nature in the reserves. Grades
and contested meanings of ownership of
these special commons are emerging. Mean-
while, through the land reform process,
some groups of the rural poor are success-
fully regaining ownership of nature conser-
vation areas from which their ancestors
were removed. These new owners are
choosing to retain the conservation function
of their newfound common property. They
face some standard and some special chal-
lenges of common property resource man-
agement as they develop systems and plans
for running and using these conservation
areas. Much broader opportunities and
challenges face people across the communal
areas (the non-freehold former black
homelands) of South Africa as they con-
template nature conservation and
ecotourism where no formal nature reserves
exist. Until land and resource tenure ar-
rangements for the communal areas are
clarified, few of the conditions for the
successful management of this kind of
common property and resource-based
enterprise can be met.
Constituting the Commons in the New South Africa
3
During the colonial era, many African
societies saw their indigenous systems and
structures of common property resource
management disrupted, perverted or de-
stroyed by externally imposed administra-
tions. South Africa experienced extreme
forms of this interference. About 13% of its
area was retained as homelands for the
black majority of the population. The
rhetoric of apartheid claimed that Africans
could live their own lives and practise their
own culture in these areas. But indigenous
political structures were perverted to ensure
that chiefs did not foment opposition to the
regime; and indigenous resource manage-
ment systems were overridden by better-
ment land use planning programmes to
conform to European norms of
sustainability and spatial structure.
By the time democracy came to South
Africa in 1994, most dimensions of rural
governance in the communal areas were in
disarray. The traditional authorities were
widely discredited (although a version of
tribal rule was ruthlessly maintained in parts
of some homelands). Local political power
was often contested between these discred-
ited chiefs and various progressive and
youth groupings. In some areas, modern
political structures had completely eclipsed
traditional ones, but lacked the institutional
capacity to govern effectively. After some
decades of control by increasingly corrupt
and incompetent homeland governments,
many local administrative services and
structures were close to collapse.
In natural resource use and management, as
in local politics, the trend in many commu-
nal areas was for indigenous structures and
systems of governance to be replaced by
conditions of open access. This did not
often mean anarchy  probably because the
livelihoods of the rural poor in the former
homelands depended on mining and urban
sector income at least as much as they did
on natural resource use. But it did mean
uncertainty and exploitation for the major-
ity of rural people who did not know how
far they could assert their resource rights in
the face of the state or of stronger, richer
users. In some sectors, such as fisheries and
wildlife use, the state and white economic
interests had largely excluded the black
majority from exploiting or managing the
resource. Meanwhile, resource degradation
was widespread in the densely populated
former homelands. It was common to
explain this degradation in terms of incom-
petent or exploitative African resource use
and management. Some Africans would
respond that any notion of environmental
care had been driven from them by the
political oppression and technical arrogance
of the colonial era.
Despite enormous achievements in many
social and economic sectors since 1994,
South Africas new democratic governments
have not distinguished themselves by the
clarity or commitment of their rural poli-
cies. They are widely accused of a lack of
concern for rural job creation, and of lacking
ideas in the fields of sustainable rural re-
source use and management. There is still
no clarity about the future of the chiefs.
Government is understandably nervous
about land tenure reform in the communal
areas, which it has not yet undertaken. So
communal area livelihoods and resource
use drift on; poverty deepens; resource
1. Introduction
by Stephen Turner
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degradation continues; and rural develop-
ment is conspicuous by its absence.
In South Africa, with its political history
and its well developed freehold and urban
sectors, notions of common property re-
source management are not widely known
or favoured. Nevertheless, some analysts
and rural development workers do argue
that the commons have a place in the social
and economic future of the country. The
framework of policy provided by the new
Constitution and other legislation certainly
allows for this. Researchers at the Pro-
gramme for Land and Agrarian Studies
(PLAAS) at the University of the Western
Cape have been among those who have
asserted the economic value of the land and
natural resources in the communal areas.
They have worked to help develop viable
concepts of non freehold tenure for South
Africa, and have explored practical ways of
rebuilding some form of group-based re-
source management in these areas. Their
research has had a practical orientation, and
has been undertaken in collaboration with
governmental and non-governmental agen-
cies. Key among the NGO colleagues of
PLAAS has been the Environmental and
Development Agency (EDA), which has
worked for sustainable rural development in
parts of the Eastern Cape for over 20 years.
Since 1997, PLAAS has made advisory and
analytical inputs to a pilot EDA programme
of community based land management in
that province.
From 31 May to 4 June 2000, a number of
PLAAS researchers attended the eighth
biennial conference of the International
Association for the Study of Common
Property (IASCP) at Bloomington, Indiana.
Together with Moses Jumo and Nick Swan
of EDA, four of the PLAAS staff made up a
panel on the problems and prospects of
constituting the commons in the new South
Africa. The panel presented and debated
some of the experience and ideas emerging
from the work of PLAAS and EDA on the
important challenges now facing South
Africa in this regard. The commons as
Africans used to know them before the
colonial era clearly cannot be reconstituted.
The question is whether some new version
of the commons can be built as a viable part
of strategy for the future of rural South
Africa.
Sections 2 - 4 below present the three
papers that were given by the PLAAS
members of the IASCP panel. Our EDA
colleagues have decided not to present their
paper as it was at IASCP, but to build it
into an overall review and report on their
experience with a community based land
management programme over the last three
years in the Eastern Cape. That review is
likely to be concluded by mid 2001. Mean-
while, we at PLAAS hope that the ideas
presented in our three papers will be a
useful input to the continuing debate on the
future of the commons in the South Africa.
For our part, we believe that the nation
must assure that future.
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2. Co-managing the commons in the new
South Africa: room for manoeuvre?
Moenieba Isaacs and Najma Mohamed
2.1. Background
In South Africa, the action space for com-
munity-based natural resource management
is largely created by post-apartheid shifts in
natural resource policies and programmes.
Natural resource management in South
Africa should seek to redress the environ-
mental legacy of the colonial and apartheid
eras. The South African government not
only faces a legacy of mistrust, disposses-
sion, and forced removals, but it also has to
restructure the land distribution regimes
that entrenched white ownership and
control over natural resources. The feasibil-
ity of common property regimes needs to be
evaluated as an avenue for addressing the
skewed land ownership patterns of the past
(Bromley, 1995). Communal tenure in
South Africa occurs on 12.25% of South
Africas land surface and it is expected that
the national land reform process will in-
crease the proportion of land under com-
munal tenure (Shackleton et al., 1998). It
is thus critical that investigations into both
the viability of group ownership and also the
management of natural resources are under-
taken.
The development of partnerships between
local resource users and other stakeholders,
broadly termed co-management, has been a
key trend in natural resource management
initiatives in South Africa and the rest of
the region (Christoffersen, 1997; IUCN,
1999). Limited state capacity to implement
conservation and natural resource manage-
ment policies effectively, and the incapacity
of local institutions to enforce rules, distrib-
ute benefits equitably and manage natural
resources sustainably, have all contributed
to the evolution, development and promo-
tion of partnerships in natural resource
management (Lawry, 1990). Co-manage-
ment arrangements essentially involve the
sharing of power and responsibility between
user groups and other groups (McCay,
1998). Though there are many definitions
of the term, co-management is generally
regarded as a middle-range management
option between state and community
management (Jentoft, 1989) that covers
various partnership arrangements and
degrees of power-sharing and integration of
local and centralised management systems
(Pomeroy and Berkes, 1997: 466). Key
distinctions therefore relate to the degree of
local participation in decision making or the
extent of devolution to the local level. Co-
management arrangements are therefore
situated along a continuum, from coerced
relationships to organic partnerships
(Katerere, 1999).
One of the key benefits put forward by the
proponents of co-management is its ability
to move beyond the limitations of either
state, private or community management.
For example, limited enforcement capacity
of community-based institutions, and
limited state understanding of local condi-
tions  shortcomings that seriously under-
mine both state and local-level environmen-
tal management  could be addressed by
combining the knowledge and strengths of
various partners. Co-management is said to
produce a further benefit of transcending
strictly defined property rights (state,
private, communal) and combining them in
imaginative ways to build productive,
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mutually beneficial relationships (Baland
and Platteau, 1996).
This paper will assess the impact of co-
management in constituting viable and
meaningful community-based resource
management systems in rural South Africa.
The distribution of material poverty in
South Africa has a strong rural dimension.
70% of the poor live in rural areas and have
limited access to basic services, such as
water and sanitation (May, 1998). Natural
resource use and harvesting also contribute
substantially to the livelihoods of people in
the communal areas of South Africa
(Shackleton et al., 2000). It is thus impor-
tant to explore the potential of natural
resource management strategies, such as co-
management, to build common property
regimes in the new South Africa. The
findings of exploratory research conducted
in two rural communities, co-management
of a conservation area in the Richtersveld
National Park and of fisheries in Elands Bay,
will be presented to assess the potential of
co-management in addressing the stark
inequalities that face rural people in the
new South Africa.
2.2. Natural resources
and the emergence of co-
management in the new
South Africa: an overview
Current natural resource issues in the rural
economy of South Africa need to be exam-
ined in the context of the political and
economic policies that have been in force -
particularly with respect to agriculture,
forestry, water resources and conservation -
during the past century, as well as the
unique opportunity of structural reforms in
rural areas brought about by the achieve-
ment of a democratic society in 1994.
(Van Zyl et al., 1996: 237)
In South Africa, a long history of disposses-
sion in the name of conservation, authoritar-
ian conservation practices and a total disre-
gard for meeting the basic needs of the
majority of the population, fuelled a nega-
tive perception of the environment (Khan,
1990; Cock, 1991). The environmental
legacy of apartheid therefore poses one of
the greatest challenges to policy reform
processes. Understanding the full extent of
the effects of institutionalised racism on the
people and environments of South Africa,
particularly in rural areas, is a prerequisite
for meaningful environmental reform
measures.
The land legislation of the early 20th century
placed 87% of the land in the hands of the
white minority. Homelands and rural re-
serves, 13% of the 1.25 million km2 national
territory, were established to house the
majority of South Africas population under
some form of communal tenure. A process
of not only political but also ecological
disenfranchisement of black communities
ensued (Durning, 1990). Many of the
ecological ills in the communal areas, attrib-
uted to poor management of natural re-
sources, are therefore rooted in the context
of the political and socio-economic policies
that were enforced in all resource sectors.
For example, the protectionist policies of
the apartheid era, such as market assistance
and subsidies for commercial agriculture,
bolstered the success of white commercial
farmers. The seemingly successful freehold
white commercial farmer was said to be
the least independent  and the least
market-oriented  of all the entrepreneurs
of the apartheid state (Bromley, 1995, 10).
The dominance of individual or private
property rights is therefore an artefact of
apartheid that should be seen within the
context of the apartheid project.
The period prior to the first democratic
elections in 1994 witnessed the growth of
an environmental movement that attempted
to link environmental and social justice
considerations. This people-centred ap-
proach to environmental issues formed part
of wider democratisation processes in the
country. The formulation of post-apartheid
natural resource policies thus incorporates
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principles of democracy, such as public
participation in the decision making proc-
esses. Both the substantive and procedural
rights of the new South Africa promote
principles of local participation, accountabil-
ity and transparency in natural resource
management. The South African constitu-
tion, in its Bill of Rights, includes an envi-
ronmental rights clause. In addition to
adopting sustainability as an important
policy principle, recent legislation has given
effect to decentralised natural resource
management by proposing the formation of
community-based institutions for managing
resources, such as catchment management
agencies. Promoting local governance has
therefore been pivotal to the policy reform
of natural resource management in South
Africa.
A commitment to public participation as a
key process in the formulation and imple-
mentation of environmental policies in the
new South Africa colours natural resource
policies. For example, in its formulation of a
national environmental policy, the Depart-
ment of Environmental Affairs and Tourism
embarked on an extensive public participa-
tion process, known as the Consultative
National Environmental Policy Process. A
similar trend has been the promotion of co-
management or partnership models. These
have featured strongly in natural resource
policy development processes and legisla-
tion. Resource sectors such as agriculture,
forestry and water expressly promote the
building of partnerships to facilitate the
implementation of national policies. Farm
equity share schemes, joint forest manage-
ment and the local government-private
sector partnerships in water provision are
examples of these partnership models. The
contribution of co-management to the
sustainable use and management of natural
resources has also featured prominently in
recent discussions on natural resource
management in South Africa (IUCN, 1999;
DEA&T, 1999). These discussions revealed
the growing importance of partnerships,
particularly with the private sector, in
community-based natural resource manage-
ment in South Africa.
Natural resource policies in South Africa are
therefore generally supportive of commu-
nity-based natural resource management,
but are hampered by three key issues. First,
policies are fragmented across departments
and secondly, there is a gap between policy
objectives and implementation. A third
issue relates to resource tenure and the
failure of government so far to reform the
confused and dysfunctional land tenure and
administration systems it inherited in the
former homelands. There is a need for
policy guidelines to ensure that the action
spaces created by policy are taken up by
rural communities. We concur with Njobe
et al. (1999: 34) who state that in practice,
partnerships are being forged and mecha-
nisms to ensure the sustainability of these
partnerships will need to be put in place.
We need to assess whether these partner-
ships incorporate key principles of co-
management, such as power sharing, em-
powerment, organisational capacity building
and improved natural resource manage-
ment.
2.2.1. Co-management in South
Africa
The rationale for the co-management
approach in South Africa was strongly
entrenched in the Reconstruction and
Development Programme (RDP), the vision
document of the African National Congress
that was subsequently formulated as a
government policy guideline document. The
RDP focused on three areas: participation/
empowerment, economic and institutional
transformation towards equity, and stability.
Hence, the RDP was a collaborative partici-
patory democracy process at local commu-
nity level between government and user-
groups in decision-making arrangements for
natural resource management. However,
with the adoption of the Growth, Employ-
ment and Redistribution strategy (GEAR)
the RDP strategy has become increasingly
governmentalised and expert-led (Stewart,
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1997). Even more important is the focus on
growth and entrepreneurship, leading
attention away from community-based
initiatives and management strategies.
Nevertheless, the short tradition of co-
management in South Africa is character-
ised by two trends, as we find in Europe and
the United States as well. In the one situa-
tion, co-management is based on a localised
coherent community having responsibility
for their resources, either in co-operation
with central state agencies or by having
delegated responsibilities. In the second
situation, we find the co-operative tradition,
where government is co-operating with
functional groups, representing the fishers,
the processors etc. While the first tradition
is heavily inspired by Zimbabwes successful
CAMPFIRE (Communal Areas Manage-
ment Programme For Indigenous Re-
sources) resource management programme
that focuses primarily on wildlife, the
second stream is more like the old system in
marine fisheries, with the important qualifi-
cation that previously, only the established
white companies participated! In both cases
we are discussing user group participation,
but in the first instance it is based on terri-
tory while in the second it is based on
function.
What then is the difference between user
group participation and co-management?
Here it is important to note that co-man-
agement as a concept originated from the
social science camp as an alternative to the
previous unsuccessful top-down manage-
ment tradition based on government con-
trol. It was equally important to come up
with an alternative to the privatisation of
resources, in the fisheries most often in
terms of Individual Transferable Quotas
(ITQs). While Jentoft (1989; 1994), as one
of the earliest writers on co-management,
was eager to specify the concept, later
writers have included nearly everything as
co-management. They have thereby diluted
the concept, making it less useful as a
research tool and a management model.
According to Jentoft (1989; 1994), co-
management should include a considerable
degree of responsibility on behalf of the
users, not only token consultations. Further-
more, co-management requires a formal set-
up delineating responsibilities and manage-
ment tasks. Later on the specifications have
been less precise. According to Sagdahl
(1992), the concept of co-management is
widely used but poorly defined.
Berkes et al. (1991, 12) suggest that co-
management is the sharing of power and
responsibility between the government and
local resource users. Berkes (1994) then
developed the ladder of participation,
trying to cover the whole range of user
group participation. Although the two
extremes on this ladder are rather uninter-
esting (few modern resource management
regimes can be based on 100% government
influence or 100 % local influence), the
alternatives given in the middle indicate
that there are different types of user group
participation. Furthermore, the five basic
models of Symes (1997) are also based on
the same principle, from extreme centrali-
sation of policy making and management
functions to the complete devolution of
those functions to an autonomous, inde-
pendent, non-governmental organisation.
What is more common in democratic
countries is the creation of an in between
arena (within the two extremes on the
continuum) where user groups can interact
(Hersoug and Ranes, 1996). When examin-
ing the definitions of co-management, the
key concept relates to power sharing be-
tween the state and stakeholders. Hence,
fishers, stakeholders or user-groups de-
grees of interests, influence and participa-
tion will vary according to the local commu-
nity and regional conditions. Consequently,
there is no patent co-management model,
which can be applied to South Africas
marginalised communities. The models
have to be developed specifically, according
to the type of resource, type of community
and the level of capacity to administer the
arrangement.
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At this stage it may be worthwhile to distin-
guish between management in general and
the more specific task of resource manage-
ment. Management may comprise a large
number of tasks including the building of
infrastructure, credit, education and train-
ing, as evidenced in the fisheries sector
(Hersoug and Rånes, 1996). Resource
management on the other hand is usually
confined to the fixing of outtake or resource
utilisation and distribution. Much of the
unfortunate confusion of the co-manage-
ment debate is due to a mixing of the
concepts (Holm et al., 2000). The fact that
fishermen are able to share in the control-
ling of fishing or the allocation of space,
does not necessarily prove that they are able
to handle the much more intricate question
of how much should be fished and how it
should be distributed. In order to define
resource management at least three minimal
requirements have to be considered:
! there has to be an intention of resource
management, not unintended effects of
measures undertaken for other reasons;
! there has to be some kind of theory
linking the resource utilisation to the
future state of the resource (this may
be formal or more casual, but the idea
is important);
! the management measures have to be
enforced in practice (not only on pa-
per).
If these requirements are fulfilled we can
talk about resource management. If re-
source management is to function as co-
management, we must in addition require
that the local users have a significant say in
all major decisions regarding the outtake.
Defined as strongly as this, there are not
many examples of resource co-management
in South Africa today. In the remainder of
this paper, two co-management initiatives
attempted in the conservation and fisheries
sectors will be assessed. We will seek to
increase our understanding of co-manage-
ment initiatives, such as the Richtersveld
National Park and Elands Bay cases, by
evaluating their potential to create viable
community-based resource management
regimes.
2.3. A typical fishing
community  the case of
Elands Bay
What type of community is Elands Bay?
According to Hasler (1998: 17), despite
the injustices and inequities of apartheid,
the Elands Bay model is an example of
community based co-management. How-
ever, fieldwork in this area clearly indicates
that since the new democracy, local proc-
esses in Elands Bay are working against
community based natural resource manage-
ment, and are embracing private entrepre-
neurship.
In many respects the community is a typical
fishing company town. The original settle-
ment was based on farming, while the
current village is based on the work avail-
able through the two original rock lobster
factories. More recently, the community has
expanded even further through the tourist
business, based on city dwellers coming for
weekends and holidays. Today Elands Bay
has a population of 1,152 inhabitants, of
whom 652 are black, 400 coloured and
100 whites. The political affiliation, due to
the large black population, is 80% African
National Congress (ANC) and 20% Demo-
cratic Alliance (DA).
The species involved in the local fisheries
include rock lobster, line fish (jakop piewe,
hottentot, harder, snoek and white mussel),
and to a lesser extent pelagic species like
sardine and anchovy and finally hake, fished
by long liners. The major form of income
includes working at the crayfish factory as
packers and fishermen, where some are
permanently employed whilst the rest are
seasonal workers. Other forms of income
include working on the potato and wine
farms outside Elands Bay in the Piketberg
district, and to a lesser extent construction
work. The female population work on the
potato farms or as packers in the fishing
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factories in the area. The salaries in the
community range from US$ 18 per week at
the potato farm to US$ 0.69 per hour as a
packer in the crayfish factory, which is
seasonal, while permanent workers in the
factory range from US$ 5 to US$ 8 per day.
The fishermen linked to the factories re-
ceive US$ 0.77 to US$ 0.89 per kg and this
is more or less the price offered by the new
entrants in the fishing industry as well.
Just like other fishing communities of the
Western Cape, Elands Bay is characterised
by a high percentage of alcohol and drug
abuse, chronic unemployment and physical
abuse of women. Other problems include a
high rate of tuberculosis and rapid increase
in cases of AIDS. The community is still
based on an apartheid style stratification
regarding living conditions, infrastructure,
economy, housing, and education level. The
types of dwellings range from spacious
dwellings in the white segment, while you
find modest brick houses in the coloured
segment and rudimentary, two-roomed
government housing and shacks in the
informal squatter settlement or in the
backyards, in the black segment of the
community. Integration between the race
groups is minimal to non-existent, mainly
limited to the work place. Although the
village is located only 300 km from Cape
Town, it is rather isolated. A trip to Cape
Town may cost up to US$ 77, as no regular
bus service is available. Even a connection to
the nearest town, 100 km away, is quite an
expedition, requiring private transport on a
gruelling gravel road. Except for the whites,
most people are stuck in Elands Bay!
2.3.1. Wheeling and dealing 
the reallocation process at the
local level
The application process for fishing quotas is
highly competitive. For West Coast Rock
Lobster (WCRL) alone, more than 1,003
applications were made, while 206 were not
considered on a technical basis. Of the 797
applicants, 403 scored as new entrants and
188 as existing right holders and only 203
were successful. That means that only one
out of every five new applicants was suc-
cessful. The rock lobster resource is more
than fully utilised, which means that reallo-
cation implies taking away quotas from old,
established companies and giving out to new
entrants from previously disadvantaged
communities. This results in a highly com-
petitive arena, with only a few winners and
many losers producing slander and accusa-
tions about corruption and quite frequently,
accusations that successful applicants are
paper quota owners, only concerned with
personal enrichment. The main concern that
preoccupies the fishing community of
Elands Bay is the acquisition of quotas and
not the management of the resource. This
has led to an increase in individual strategies
to acquire quotas, primarily by establishing
closed corporations or private companies,
thereby reducing the collective concern and
the culture of group action within the
community (see Figure 1). Even when
people create a fishermans co-operative,
the number of participants is limited and
tends to follow colour lines.
In Elands Bay the competitive players can
be classified as the established white
industry, new entrepreneurial  blacks and
coloureds, and the large group of unsuc-
cessful players. The racial segregation in the
community leads to racially based competi-
tion and conflict between the various play-
ers for the high value rock lobster industry
(Export price per kg is US$ 18-20). Elands
Bay has two major white owned companies
(Elandia Visserye (Pty.) Ltd. and Elands Bay
Handelsmaatskappy (Pty.) Ltd.) that man-
age 74 % of the total quotas of the town,
while the six new entrants  (Alpha (Pty.)
Ltd., Bafiaansberg (Pty.) Ltd.,
Bobbejaansberg Closed Corporation (CC),
Ithuba CC, Thandani CC and a co-opera-
tive affiliated to the South African Com-
mercial Fishermans Corporation) share the
remaining 26 %  (see Table 1). This does
not mean that co-operation between them
is non-existent. On the one hand we find
the new entrants with quotas, but seldom
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with boats, processing facilities or marketing
competence. On the other hand we find
established owners and processors eager to
utilise their full capacity. The result is, so
far, different types of arrangements,
whereby the old processors are hired to do
fishing, processing or marketing (see Figure
2). If all stages are included we have what in
practical terms is labelled a paper quota
transaction, whereby the new applicant is
just hiring out his fishing right for a rather
handsome net profit, without any risk
involved. However, according to the rules
this cannot be done for more than two
years, within which the new entrant will
have to acquire some form of equity or run
the risk of losing the quota.
The interesting question now is to what
extent the new entrants will succeed in
establishing new ventures, thereby creating
more employment than before and creating
a wider distribution of the benefits.
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Catching, Processing and Marketing with fixed season
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Figure 3.  Organisation of new entrants in the West Coast Rock Lobster industry in
Elands Bay.
Name Status Race 95/96 96/97 97/98 98/99 99/00
1 Alpha Visserye New Entrant Coloured 5,000 7,000 5,857 5,000
(Pty.) Ltd.
2 Bafiaanberg New Entrant Coloured 5,000
(Pty.) Ltd.
3 Bobbejaanberg New Entrant Black 5,000 7,000 5,857 5,857
Visserye CC
4 Deseeda Established White 7,053 7,277 7,277 6,089 6,089
Seeprodukte Industry
 (Pty.) Ltd.
5 Elandia Visserye Established White 36,544 37,709 37,709 31,551 31,551
(Pty.) Ltd. Industry
6 Elands Bay Established  White 55,176 56,933 56,933 47,635 43,348
Handelsmaatskappy Industry
(Pty.) Ltd.
7 Ithuba Fisheries New Entrant Coloured 5,000 7,000 5,857 5,857
CC & Blacks
8 SACFC New Entrant Coloured 2,840
(Co-operative) & Blacks
9 Thandani Fisheries New Entrant Coloured 5,000
CC & Blacks
Total Amount in Elands Bay 98,773 116,919 122,919 102,846 110,942
Total Amount WCRL 1,500,000 1,700,000 1,913,500 1,601,000 1,613,477
Table 1. Elands Bay quota allocation from 1995/96 to 1999/2000, measured in kg.
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In Elands Bay the history so far is mixed.
One the one side there are new entrants
with limited knowledge of the industry.
They often lack skills in planning, organis-
ing, and filling in of quota applications, and
have limited to no knowledge of the har-
vesting, processing and market value of the
rock lobster. Hence, there is a strong de-
pendence on lawyers to assist not only in
the running of the organisation but also in
the application process. Questionable joint
venture agreements are also being con-
structed with the local established company
with the intention to maintain both their
quota allocations. Furthermore, allegations
are going around in the community that
some of the new entrants are using the
profits to invest in other sectors (bars and
taxis) rather than investing directly in the
fishing industry (see Figure 3). However, on
the other side, you find new entrants who
have invested in boats, rock lobster traps
and vehicles with the intention to harvest
their own quota. They also have clear
objectives relating to processing and mar-
keting of their own quota in the future.
Worst off are the new applicants who
invested heavily in support in order to write
the application. With lawyers charging US
$769 per application plus a percentage of
the value of the quota if successful, the
unsuccessful are saddled with large debts,
which they cannot pay for years to come
with their meagre incomes. So far most
inhabitants are unhappy, either because
they have not received any quota at all, or
they have received a smaller share than
anticipated, or they have received less
money from their share than anticipated.
This is nothing exceptional, taking the sky-
high expectations into consideration. The
confusion has created room for the organisa-
tional entrepreneur, a creature that is
becoming increasingly visible on the national
scene as well. In the fishing industry the
organisational entrepreneur can be de-
fined as someone who uses new opportuni-
ties to create a formal or informal organisa-
tion within which others can participate
actively or non-actively (Oliver and
Marwell 1992: 268-269). The organisational
entrepreneur can also be compared to the
Figure 4.  Distribution of profits (examples from Elands Bay).
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local elites and gatekeepers who prevent
information from filtering down to the rest
of the community or, in this case, fishers.
They often have the role of leaders; they are
the ones who take the initiative to organise
the fishermen, all with the aim of applying
for quotas. In Elands Bay organisational
entrepreneurs consist of the more advan-
taged and resourceful persons. Hence, their
characteristics, skills and strategies include:
! management, entrepreneurial experi-
ence, computer courses;
! leadership skills;
! networking with the dominant political
party (ANC);
! utilise the media to highlight problems
in the fishing community;
! utilise the services of lawyers and
attorneys to complete the permit/quota
application;
! good communication skills;
! an ability to organise and gain the trust
of the fishermen; and
! own other businesses and are expanding
into this industry.
It is evident that these entrepreneurs have
the power, skills and much stronger finan-
cial assets so that they can take advantage of
the enabling environment that the govern-
ment created, at the expense of the poor
and the illiterate. But the situation is more
complicated than portrayed in the usual
rhetoric, whereby the real fishermen are left
out while the new entrepreneurs have
grabbed the quotas and the money. In
Elands Bay the owners of the new compa-
nies do not themselves participate in the
actual fishing, nor in the processing.
In any case, the community members are
not at all concerned with the actual manage-
ment of the industry or the resource. They
are concerned with the allocation of quotas
as ways to get rich quick. Neither is the
state, represented by the Directorate:
Marine and Coastal Management (MCM),
particularly interested in sharing any re-
sponsibility. MCM fixes the quota, the
Minister decides the distribution (based on
Inform
ation
advice from MCM), technical regulations
are fixed by MCM, and control and surveil-
lance are performed by MCM. Hence,
fishers are only responding to top-down
initiatives from the government agency. As
yet there are absolutely no signs of co-
management, even interpreted in its weak-
est forms as indicated in the diagram below
(Figure 4). Furthermore, there is a lack of
understanding on the side of the state about
the internal heterogeneity, the economic
differentiation, the socio-political
factionalism and the power structures, not
only in the community of Elands Bay but in






Monitoring, Control and Surveillance
Fishers
Figure 5.  Present system of fisheries co-
management in South Africa
2.3.2.  Ideals and realities: what
can be learned from the case of
Elands Bay?
The ideal community in Elands Bay does
not exist. Instead, private entrepreneurship
is playing a strong role. Certain groups and
individuals who form part of the local elites
monopolise power structures, quotas and
development at the local level by a process
of excluding and preventing the real
marginalised individuals and groups from
actively participating in the local initiatives.
On the other hand, given the political
position of the state and its commitment to
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address the needs of the disadvantaged
communities (which certainly include
fishing communities), the prospect of a
genuine redistribution process does seem
positive. Besides, on many occasions the
South African government has promoted
the goal of co-management. So far there are
very few viable projects in practice and one
reason is clearly that the actors are poorly
organised. Hence, some support for organi-
sational initiatives seems to be a prerequi-
site for a more realistic approach to the co-
management question. Whether fishers are
going to be organised on the basis of terri-
tory or function will have to be decided on a
case-by-case basis. For certain species
territory will be appropriate while for others
(like hake long-lining), functional groups are
probably more convenient. If assistance to
community fishing organisations is a prior-
ity, then maybe the time has come for co-
management. However, before implement-
ing a co-management arrangement in poor
fishing communities that in most cases seem
to be the ideal setting, certain prerequisites
need to be met:
! a relatively large number of new en-
trants have been brought into the
industry with small quotas per entrant
(approximately 25 % of the important
hake quota and 31% of the WCRL
quota). However, the large companies
are still dominating, although the trend
is definitely working in the direction of
a more diversified ownership. But it
depends entirely on how the new
entrants are organising their quotas and
the support structures available to
them. At present we have a number of
paper quota owners, people who have
been allocated a small quota and then
either sell or lease it to established
operators for cash. That is to be ex-
pected, since two years to acquire
equity is too brief if one does not have
any other access to capital than the
value of the quota(s). A possible solu-
tion would be a dramatic intervention
by government in the transformation
process that focuses on the allocation of
certain marine resources, for example
WCRL, abalone, hake long lining and
white mussels, to particular fishing
communities. Currently, there are no
particular reasons (except historical) for
large companies to be in WCRL. The
catching is based on simple technology
and so is the processing. Selling on
advanced export markets can still be
handled by the specialised marketing
organisations. On the other hand, hake
trawling is highly capital intensive and
so is part of the processing (freezing),
making this sub sector less viable for
new entrants. However, there is a need
for a strategic transformation plan with
clear and specific goals that strike a
compromise, between equity (through
reallocation) and stability (regarding
employment and foreign exchange);
! lacking entrepreneurial skills, new rights
holders are easy prey for more experi-
enced players. There is an urgent need
to establish training, especially in
entrepreneurial skills. If the policy is to
level the playing field, training is a
responsibility also for MCM, eventually
in co-operation with NGOs and other
interested participants. Training should
be a requirement for all successful new
applicants. The established industry
should be made to share in this respon-
sibility, with clear training goals at-
tached;
! many of the new operators do not have
any access to credit (other than the
value of the quota when sold). It goes
without saying that investment in boats,
processing or marketing facilities is
difficult based just on own earnings.
Maybe South Africa already has the
necessary institutions to establish credit
facilities, but they are certainly not
present in the fishing communities.
Hence government intervention is
needed to support new entrants in
becoming more competitive and visible
in the industry;
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! one way of promoting co-management
is the introduction of a resource fee for
leasing the fishing right. A resource fee
is a means by which society can benefit
from giving the fishing industry the
privilege of using a national resource.
Not everyone can receive a quota as
most of the marine resources in South
Africa are at maximum capacity level,
but everybody can benefit from state
income being used for general purposes
like education, health and housing.
As pointed out by Hersoug and Holm
(forthcoming), strong state participation is a
necessary but not sufficient requirement to
bring about a more equitable participation
in the South African fishing industry. The
next step will be to include the new rights/
quota holders as well as the subsistence and
recreational fishers in some form of co-
management. The present system is no-
where near co-management as it is usually
portrayed in the CAMPFIRE wildlife pro-
gramme (Martin, 1986; Cumming, 1990;
Jansen, 1990; Bond, 1993; Hasler, 1993;
Taylor, 1993) or fisheries (Jentoft, 1989;
Ostrom, 1990; Oakerson, 1992; McCay,
1993; Pomeroy and Williams, 1994;
Raakjear-Nielsen and Vedsman, 1996). In
order to approach such a system the state
will have to relinquish control and enhance
local capacity, and the local resource users





The local communities of the Richtersveld,
an area rich in mineral and natural re-
sources, entered into a contractual agree-
ment with the then National Parks Board
(known since 1996 as South African Na-
tional Parks) in July 1991. This agreement
was a milestone for the implementation of
new conservation policies and practices in
South Africa. This biologically rich area,
situated in the northwestern corner of
South Africa, had long been earmarked as a
potential conservation area. The mountain
desert environment, with its associated
natural endowments, is said to have the
most biologically diverse representation of
this particular biome. With substantial
support from the wider conservation com-
munity, the National Parks Board (NPB)
entered into negotiations to establish a
contractual national park in the
Richtersveld. In August 1991, the 162,445
hectares Richtersveld National Park (RNP)
was proclaimed.
The people of the Richtersveld, which
under apartheid was a coloured rural
reserve and is now part of the Northern
Cape province, are well aware of the wealth
contained within their harsh desert environ-
ment. In addition to the arrival of colonial
settlers in the late 19th century, rich depos-
its of alluvial diamonds were discovered in
the 1920s. The inhabitants of the
Richtersveld were subject therefore not
only to colonial and apartheid legislation
and development schemes, but also to the
exploitation of the regions mineral wealth
by state and private mining operators. While
many Richtersvelders were employed in the
mining operations, very few benefits and
improvements were visible in the towns
located in the reserve. Instead, wealth was
siphoned from the area to fill distant cof-
fers. The difficulties in establishing the
contractual park (described below), have to
be seen within the context of this legacy of
mistrust created by the exploitative mining
industry.
The Richtersveld consists of four towns,
Kuboes and Sanddrif in the North and
Eksteenfontein and Lekkersing in the South.
The people of the Richtersveld are amongst
the poor in South Africa and both infra-
structure and service provision is undevel-
oped (Eco-Africa, 1999). Two of the
Richtersveld towns were only electrified in
December 1999, while roads in the area are
in a poor condition. This should be con-
trasted with the concentration of infrastruc-
ture around the mining companies. The
ANC is the majority party in the
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Richtersveld, but other political parties,
such as the Democratic Alliance, are visible.
In addition to employment at the mines, the
4,000 souls in the Richtersveld depend on
the natural resources of the area for their
livelihoods. Livestock farming forms an
important source of livelihoods, but the
mountainous terrain and mining concessions
reduce the amount of land available for
grazing. Increased pressure is therefore
placed on existing grazing lands. An attempt
to privatise the communal grazing land of
the Richtersveld was met with opposition
and was challenged in the Supreme Court in
1989. Communal use of the grazing lands is
therefore widespread in the Richtersveld. In
the same year, the community objected to
the contractual agreement reached by the
NPB and the local government for establish-
ing a national park in the Richtersveld. The
NPB then had to restart negotiations with
community representatives. The park was
only proclaimed two years later.
In principle, the process of NPB-community
negotiations should have led to community-
driven co-management of the RNP. How-
ever, poor representation of community
interests on the joint management commit-
tee results in the conservation agency being,
in practice, the lead partner. This is in stark
contrast to the principles that underscored
the establishment of the park. To some
people in the Richtersveld, the park is seen
as a paper park that exists only in the ink
on the contractual agreement. Nevertheless,
broader political and economic development
processes in the Richtersveld have created a
space for re-configuring the role of the park
in the broader region. It is crucial that
privatisation trends observed in other
resource sectors, such as fisheries and
forestry, not derail the chances for commu-
nity-based conservation in the Richtersveld.
2.4.1. People and parks in the
Richtersveld
Vehement opposition from the Richtersveld
communities to the establishment of the
RNP led to a court interdict on the eve of
the signing of the agreement for proclaiming
a national park in the area. Though the park
was to be premised on a contractual model,
the communities were not satisfied with the
compensatory mechanisms, or with many
other conditions as set out in the agreement
with the local authority. Negotiations had
primarily been taking place between the
NPB and the local authority. A Park Resist-
ance Movement (Parkeweerstandsbeweging)
was formed to ensure that representatives
from local communities were included in
negotiations around the establishment of
the park. After lengthy negotiations, an
agreement was finally reached in 1991. This
agreement addressed community concerns
and culminated in the signing of a contract
between the NPB and the community of
the Richtersveld. The contract agreement
specified a number of conditions for the
management of the park, such as the estab-
lishment of a joint management committee
and the improvement of infrastructure in
the area. The key differences between the
1989 and 1991 agreements are outlined in
Table 2 below.
According to the contractual agreement, a
Management Plan Committee (known by
its Afrikaans acronym, BPK) was set up to
guide the management of the park. The
park accommodated the seemingly competi-
tive land uses of conservation, grazing and
mining within its borders. Agreements were
reached that existing mining operations
could continue and that local stock farmers
would be accommodated within the park.
The farmers were allowed to graze 6,600
livestock in the park, a figure that would be
reviewed. The South African National Parks
(SANP) would also compensate the stock
farmers for the loss in grazing by providing
two farms for their use. The contribution of
the park can be seen in both direct and
indirect benefits for the Richtersvelders
(Participatory Research and Planning CC,
1999).
The SANP leases the park land from the
Richtersvelders and the monies are then
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distributed by a charitable trust, the
Richtersveld Community Trust. The trust,
which consists of independent board mem-
bers, administers the funds, which are
primarily spent on educational and social
upliftment programmes in the area. Pres-
ently, 16 residents of the Richtersveld are
employed at the park in both conservation
and other positions, while the park also
provided assistance in setting up a social
worker in the Richtersveld. The initial fears
of the community that stock farming would
be phased out (as proposed in the 1989
agreement, see Table 2), have been allayed
and the park farmers who use the grazing
land within the park get assistance and
support from the SANP. These tangible
benefits do not reflect all the objectives of
the contractual agreement, but are never-
theless important signs that some benefits
have filtered through to the community.
There have been a number of indirect
benefits to the Richtersveld, notably those
tied to the realisation of ecotourism. The
RNP has increased the potential of commu-
nity-based tourism in the area. A revival of
cultural tourism, exemplified in the resur-
gence of Nama language and culture in the
Richtersveld, reflects the shifts in conserva-
tion thinking. The vision of the SANP is to
acquire and manage a system of national
parks that represents indigenous wildlife,
vegetation, landscape and associated cul-
tural assets of South Africa (Joseph and
Parris, 2000: 19). This trend is further
strengthened by the emergence of social
ecology thinking in the national parks
structure. A social ecologist is currently
working in the RNP and is involved, along
with a German-funded programme,
TRANSFORM, in a range of community-
based programmes. Though the park has
brought important benefits to the
Richtersveld, critical questions have
emerged as to whether the park is truly a
co-management arrangement.
Kiewiet Cloete, a small diamond miner and
resident of Kuboes laughs cynically when
told the Richtersveld was heralded as [a]
landmark of successful people and govern-
 The Richtersveld National Park contract
Management Pre 1989 Post 1990
structure
NPB  with input from an Management Plan Committee with four
Advisory Board (no decision members from the NPB and five elected
making powers) appointed by from and by the community  one for
local government. each of the villages and one to represent
stock farmers.
Use of the Three zones with gradual Utilisation of grazing and other natural
park withdrawal of all use within resources remains. Stock numbers limited
one year. to status quo of 1989 But Ceiling of stock
Corridor west farms as numbers to come down as stock enters
compensation for grazing. the corridor west farms for grazing.
Payment of Into coffers of local Trust formed. Community members
lease government. elect Trustees (who are outsiders).
Lease period 99 years 24 years + 6 year notice period
Table 2. Incorporating community considerations in the RNP contractual agreement
(Archer et al., 1996).
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ment co-operation: Because you see a good
eye you forget about the bad parts.
(van Sleight and Weinberg, 1998:10)
Important shifts in South African conserva-
tion thinking have stemmed from the RNP,
such as the framework for co-management
of conservation areas. But there have been
criticisms that the conditions set out in the
contractual agreement have not been ful-
filled. The first issue relates to the function-
ing of the BPK. Four town representatives, a
stock farmer representative and four SANP
officials constitute the BPK. Community
representatives are elected on a biennial
basis. There are many problems with the
functioning of the park, such as a lack of
active participation in decision-making by
community representatives of the BPK, as
well as poor feedback to communities. The
community representatives also have to
attend BPK meetings at their own cost and
distances between the Richtersveld towns
are very long. The poor functioning of the
BPK relates both to a lack of capacity to
participate in decision making, as well as a
lack of community interest in the park. The
BPK is seen as an ineffectual committee but
at the same time community attendance at
elections or feedback meetings is poor.
Frequent changes in park management do
not facilitate continuity on the side of the
SANP and it becomes difficult to build the
rapport required for the BPK to function
effectively. The fact that the BPK continues
to meet is a sign that all is not lost and that
the Richtersvelders are still willing to make
the park work.
The second issue relates to the development
of a management plan for the Richtersveld,
which, nine years since the signing of the
agreement, has not been concluded. This is
critical as the tenuous relationship between
conservation, mining and stock farming
needs to be guided by sound management
guidelines. While these are not in place,
transgressions by the resource users cannot
be effectively monitored and rectified along
agreed lines. Many other issues, related to
mining, grazing and ecotourism in the park,
necessitate the development of a manage-
ment plan. Research currently being under-
taken into the sustainability of grazing
within the park could be important in kick-
starting the development of a plan. The
failure of the SANP to deliver on the prom-
ises made during the signing of the agree-
ment and the concomitant social problems
facing the Richtersvelders, such as unem-
ployment and poor infrastructure, are a
third issue impacting on the agreement.
However, many of the promises made by
the SANP were unrealistic and beyond the
scope of a conservation agency (Reid,
2000). This has had serious implications in
creating a perception that the park had not
delivered on its promises.
Underlying these issues is a history of
tension between the northern and southern
towns of the Richtersveld, further exacer-
bating the functioning of the park. In prac-
tice therefore, the RNP as it currently
stands, is essentially seen as a paper park or
as Fakir (1996) puts it, a compensatory
mechanism in which the SANP is the key
decision maker. The community at present
does not influence the way in which devel-
opment in the park takes place. However, a
number of processes, which include the
transfer of the communal land of the
Richtersveld, on which the park is situated,
bode well for the future of community-
based co-management in the Richtersveld.
2.4.2. From a paper to a
peoples park
There are at present a number of initiatives
that provide an opportunity for restructur-
ing the co-management agreement in the
RNP. Transfer of communal lands from the
state to the Richtersvelders, local government
restructuring, opportunities for community-
based tourism development and trans-
frontier conservation and development
initiatives are a few of the processes currently
impacting on the area. In 1998, the govern-
ment enacted the transfer of communal
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lands, held in trust by the Minister of
Agriculture and Land Affairs, to the com-
munities living on the land. Communities
are then given the option of transferring the
land to the municipal authority that will
administer and manage the land on behalf of
the community, or to form a legal entity,
such as a communal property association
(CPA), which will own and manage the
land. The second option, of forming a CPA,
appears to be favoured by the
Richtersvelders. This will enhance the
proprietorship of the Richtersvelders, who
could harness the power given them by legal
ownership to participate fully in the man-
agement of land, whether it is for grazing,
conservation or mining purposes. They will
therefore be the legal owners of the land on
which the RNP is situated.
Local government restructuring incorporates
a number of processes aimed at improving
local governance and municipal resource
allocation. Municipal boundary demarcation
is particularly important in addressing the
inequalities of municipal resource distribu-
tion and service provision under the apart-
heid governance system. The participatory,
community-driven integrated development
planning (IDP) process that has just been
initiated in the Richtersveld through a series
of community meetings and workshops
provides an ideal opportunity to set local
development objectives, identify priority
areas and develop an integrated vision for
the Richtersveld. It is therefore critical that
conservation plans be integrated into this
process. This could be a unique opportunity
to ensure that the national park, which
remains an important asset for the
Richtersveld, is linked to proposed commu-
nity conservation initiatives, such as a
community conservancy that will link the
park to the nearby Helskloof provincial
conservation area. Limited opportunities for
the expansion of stock farming and the
decommissioning of the mines in the future
point to the need to investigate other land
use options. The Richtersvelders fully
recognise the importance of conservation
and tourism for the region.
The RNP had 5,000 visitors in 1999, with
limited benefits to the community. A
number of initiatives in the towns of the
Richtersveld illustrate the way in which
communities are positioning themselves to
establish and run community-based tourism
initiatives. As noted above, these include
the revival of the Nama culture that is
shared by many in the Richtersveld. The
Nama language is already being taught in
one village and is increasingly being spoken.
In one of the villages a campsite was built
using traditional Nama techniques. These
are known as matjieshuise. Community
tourism fora have also been set up and
information pamphlets are being distrib-
uted. The communities are active in devel-
oping the tourism potential of the area and
have linked into a new initiative, a consor-
tium of community-based tourism initia-
tives along the west coast and western
interior of South Africa. The South-North
tourism route will link a lattice of commu-
nity-based tourism initiatives that provide a
tourism experience vastly different from
mainstream tourism in South Africa. The
idea is for community-based tourism enter-
prises situated along this route (which will
stretch from Cape Town to Namibia) to
market themselves jointly.
Conservation thinking has also shifted
towards the notion of trans-frontier conser-
vation. A number of initiatives related to
trans-frontier conservation in the
Richtersveld have been mooted. This will
involve linking the RNP and the Ais Ais
Nature Reserve in Namibia, as well as a
coastal trans-frontier initiative that centres
on the Ramsar site at the mouth of the
Orange River. For both the Namibian and
South African conservation authorities,
mining companies pose the biggest chal-
lenge in realising trans-frontier initiatives.
These processes have the potential to
transform the RNP from a paper to a peo-
ples park in that they strengthen the pro-
prietorship of the Richtersvelders, link
conservation and development objectives
Constituting the Commons in the New South Africa
21
through ecotourism, and engage local people
in setting development objectives and
priorities. In this way, they can create
opportunities for re-configuring the role of
the park and incorporating conservation into
broader rural development planning. The
days in which parks were fenced and seen as
islands of biodiversity are fast disappearing.
For the SANP to avoid the legacy of mis-
trust and exploitation associated with
mining companies in the area, the RNP
must be reconfigured, in a practical sense,
on the fundamental principles of co-man-
agement: power sharing, capacity building
and equitable benefit distribution. How-
ever, as in the fisheries and other natural
resource sectors, conservation in South
Africa no longer enjoys the influential
support that it did during apartheid. Macro-
economic changes have prompted broader
engagement between the conservation and
private sectors.
The SANP has also embarked on a process
of commercialisation in which non-core
functions, such as lodge development and
service provision will be outsourced. The
private sector is well placed, in terms of
capacity, skills and capital, to perform non-
core functions in conservation areas. How-
ever, contractual parks bind conservation
agencies to identify communities as key
partners in conservation development and
the increasing ecotourism opportunities that
accompany these. In a market increasingly
driven by economic growth rather than
redistributive or ecological principles,
contractual agreements could thus entrench
local involvement in protected area manage-
ment. The lessons learned from the
Richtersveld are therefore key in guiding
the shift toward greater local involvement in
protected area management in South Africa.
2.4.3. Community-based co-
management: lessons for the
conservation sector
The RNP was the first park in South Africa
that was established, in its entirety, on a
contractual basis. Since 1991, the contrac-
tual model has increasingly been replicated.
Broader developments in South Africa, that
include paradigm shifts in conservation, an
increase in land claims in and around na-
tional parks and changes within the SANP
structure, all favour the introduction of the
co-management model (Cock and Fig,
1999; Wynberg and Kepe, 1999). For
example, the establishment of contractual
agreements with two communities that
successfully claimed their lands back from
the SANP - the Khomani San in Kalahari
Gemsbok National Park and the Makuleke
in the Kruger National Park - are currently
underway. A model of contractual parks, as
they are presently configured in South
Africa, is provided below (Figure 5). These
incorporate the primary goals of co-manage-
ment partners.
The SANP will therefore increasingly have
to engage with different stakeholders and
reconcile variable, even competing objec-
tives, into developing parks that work for
both nature and people. The most impor-
tant lessons drawn from the Richtersveld
experience are highlighted below.
! the establishment of Joint Manage-
ment Committees is a critical step in
giving effect to the principles of con-
tractual parks. Firstly, one has to ensure
that there is clarity about the objectives
and that management plans are drawn
up in close consultation with commu-
nity members. Capacity building and
training should be tied closely to this
process, as limited organisational capac-
ity often exists in rural communities.
Though civil society support and techni-
cal expertise, such as that of lawyers,
are critical during the set-up period of
the contractual agreement, external
support should lessen with time, yield-
ing to full community involvement. The
second issue relates to power sharing
within co-management structures, such
as Joint Management Committees. This
is particularly important in cases where
communities are the owners of the land
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on which the park is situated, thereby
holding a powerful position in the
partnership. For this to occur, the
power relationships, particularly be-
tween the conservation authorities and
communities, need to change. The
following quote is from the former
Director of the Social Ecology Unit of
the SANP:
Equal partnership between local communi-
ties and National Parks becomes an elusive
concept, because the relationship is at best
unequal as the control of resources rests with
National Parks officials. Those involved in
programme development and implementation
exercise considerable power over communi-
ties. The nature of the relationship between
the community and park needs to change
fundamentally.
(Dladla, 1998: 7)
! while the motivations for entering into
contractual agreements often differ, it is
critical that a relationship of mutual
South African
National Parks
(biodiversity conservation and management)
Facilitators:
Government Departments & NGOS
(enabling partnership development and
local natural resource ownership)




(joint ventures / enterprise development)
Figure 6. Present system of contractual parks in South Africa.
trust and respect exist between part-
ners. The legacy of authoritarian conser-
vation in South Africa behoves conser-
vation authorities to recognise the
importance of restructuring people and
parks relations. Without this, conserva-
tion authorities will be seen, like the
mining companies in the Richtersveld,
as acting in their own interests. The
most fundamental step in this direction
would be to place conservation objec-
tives squarely within the broader socio-
political and economic landscape. This
is one of the most important lessons
drawn from the Richtersveld experi-
ence;
! a number of processes, broadly aimed at
rural restructuring, such as the inte-
grated development planning process
and municipal demarcation, have
opened up a space for integrating
conservation and development objec-
tives. The detailed planning process
that the community has embarked upon
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will result in the development of an
integrated development plan for the
whole of the Richtersveld. This plan
will be submitted to the provincial
government, which will disburse funds
along the lines identified and prioritised
by the people of the area. It is therefore
a unique opportunity to ensure that
conservation plans are incorporated
with proposals for infrastructure and
economic development projects;
! the transfer of communal land to a legal
entity, a Communal Property Associa-
tion, will hopefully strengthen the sense
of ownership that Richtersvelders have
over the area. The park is situated
within this communal area. Though
SANP has leased the land from the
community for the past ten years, the
community now has an opportunity to
exercise its full proprietary rights over
the management of the land.
Tensions between community involvement
and the increasing importance of private
sector involvement in resource conservation
and ecotourism are an important issue for
the conservation sector in South Africa. The
challenge to communities is to position
themselves to occupy the action space
created by macro-economic and paradigm
shifts in conservation. Broader legal, politi-
cal and economic restructuring processes,
like the local government restructuring
processes, are currently afoot in the whole
of South Africa. These processes provide an
opportunity for local communities to engage
fully in setting and prioritising local devel-
opment objectives. It is only through this
active engagement, within the context of
rural peoples struggles and needs, that co-
management initiatives can meaningfully
integrate conservation and development
objectives.
2.5. Conclusions
Landlessness, unemployment and a lack of
basic services continue to be all too com-
mon in rural South Africa. Resource man-
agement, in the context of communal lands
and common pool resources in South Af-
rica, faces many pressures. While co-man-
agement has been put forward as a way to
engage rural communities in managing the
commons, limited capacity within local
communities could result in the usurpation
of local needs and priorities by outside
goals. Community involvement therefore
needs to move beyond coercion and consul-
tation to full participation.
Co-management does provide a framework
to develop local incentives for sustainable
natural resource use. It can facilitate power
sharing for natural resource management
and conservation, participation of local
peoples, legitimacy, and an opportunity to
introduce enterprise-based partnerships
with the private sector (Jentoft, 1989;
McCay, 1998; Hara, 1999). However, in
South Africa, co-management increasingly
implies direct engagement of rural commu-
nities with market forces. Though sustain-
able use of natural resources was one of the
key goals in the RDP, it has received far less
attention in the new macro-economic
strategy of the government  Growth,
Employment and Redistribution (GEAR).
This strategy, premised on neo-liberal
trends, such as privatisation and a decrease
in social expenditure, has come under
criticism from a number of quarters (Na-
tional Institute for Economic Policy, 1996).
While the RDP vision of meeting basic
needs and developing human resources
remains in the new policy principles, the
practical implementation arena is domi-
nated by the neo-liberal vision of GEAR.
Tensions between economic growth, sus-
tainable growth and job creation, are not
addressed by GEAR. Nor is the focus on
individual entrepreneurship in the natural
resource sector, which is significantly less
job creating than group management, being
questioned.
Further cause for concern lies in the ab-
sence of sustainable development objectives
from the GEAR strategy. This is manifested
in decreasing budget allocations to the
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Department of Environmental Affairs and
Tourism. Fragmentation of environmental
policies (Peart and Wilson, 1997) and signs
of weakness in the environment movement
(Fakir, 2000), further threaten coherent
action on environmental issues in South
Africa. Researchers are expressing fears
about the rapid privatisation and commer-
cialisation processes impacting on communi-
ties. For example, rapid privatisation of
South Africas state forests has important
implications for community claims on forest
plantations (Evans and von Maltitz, 1999).
The move towards privatisation and market
liberalisation (globalisation) across the
southern African region confirm that the
private sector is increasingly becoming
involved in economic development pro-
grammes linked to the utilisation of the
regions rich natural resource base. Critical
questions are emerging, such as how to
reconcile short-term priorities of the private
sector, such as profit-generation, with local
benefits and goals related to sustainable
natural resource use, justice and equity.
This is an important source of concern as
market considerations could undermine
local priorities.
The pressures on the creation of commu-
nity-based co-management leave little room
for communities to manoeuvre and to place
themselves in favourable positions. For co-
management in both the fisheries and
conservation sectors, there needs to be a
clearer understanding of the rights, roles
and responsibilities of partners. In both
sectors, privatisation looms large on the
horizon, organisational entrepreneurs are
emerging and there is a lack of organisa-
tional capacity at the local level. However,
opportunities for redistribution and owner-
ship of the commons exist in both the
conservation and fisheries sectors. In order
to seize these opportunities, power sharing
and resource redistribution have to be made
a reality. Even then, co-management will
have to be seen more as a long-term proc-
ess, rather than a fixed short-term goal.
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In the early 20th century, the South African
government was concerned that land occu-
pied by the African indigenous people was
degraded.  This culminated in the introduc-
tion of the betterment scheme as an
approach to address the perceived problem
of the spread of degradation.
Efforts to rehabilitate or stabilise agricul-
tural land in the communal areas took shape
in the 1930s as the international concern
with soil conservation spread into South
African policy. The 1932 Native Economic
Commission drew attention to the environ-
mental problems in the native areas, which
it described as severe, an obstacle to agricul-
tural development and a threat to the
direction of native policy. It argued that
soil erosion, the apparent destruction of
grazing areas and the drying up of springs in
the reserves needed to be combated. Legis-
lation for the culling of excess stock in these
areas had already been enacted by Procla-
mation 31 of 1939 (although it was widely
resisted and not effectively implemented
until after World War 2).
Four years after the 1932 Commission, the
Secretary for Native Affairs made a state-
ment on land policy with plans for the
rehabilitation of the reserves, including
surveys of each location (local area) before
land reclamation began. Yawitch (1981: 10)
has argued that the perceptions driving
policy at this time were of Africans as
inherently poor farmers with an irrational
desire to accumulate cattle and an unwill-
ingness to accept crop rotation It is
because of this that the division of the land,
the limitation of stock and anti-erosion
measures were seen as the ultimate solution
to the problem.  And it is because such a
solution did not take the political and
economic factors that had forced reserve
agriculture to deteriorate into consideration,
that such solutions could not and did not
work.  It was not necessarily that these
measures were a failure in their own terms,
but because they were implemented with-
out sufficient consideration of the existing
social conditions and the causes of those
conditions, they served only to antagonise
the local populations.
The strategy of betterment first emerged
from these concerns in the 1930s. It com-
bined physical land reclamation measures
(such as gully rehabilitation) with land use
planning that reorganised and segregated the
three principal elements in the communal
areas landscape: settlement areas, arable
land and grazing land. These measures were
sometimes accompanied by other agricul-
tural development measures such as the
introduction of stock dipping tanks and the
fencing of grazing areas into camps in which
rotational grazing schemes were introduced.
The South African Native Trust was estab-
lished by the Native Trust and Land Act of
1936 to administer those areas set aside for
exclusive black occupation in terms of the
earlier Natives Land Act of 1913 as well as
those additional areas designated for black
occupation (and still to be made available)
3. Achieving a brighter future for
the communal range lands in Maluti
District: strategies and process
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in terms of the 1936 Act. The Trust was
empowered to adopt remedial, rehabilita-
tive and redemptive measures for the
existing reserves and for the land to be
acquired. Substantial areas were treated
with betterment measures in the late
1930s and the 1940s. But the policy was
reinforced and restructured after the report
of the Tomlinson Commission for the
Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu
Areas in 1953. This Commission was set up
to conduct an exhaustive enquiry into and
to report on a comprehensive scheme for
the rehabilitation of the Native Areas with a
view to developing within them a social
structure in keeping with the culture of the
Native and based on effective socio-eco-
nomic planning (Houghton, 1956: 1).  The
Tomlinson Commission reported that black
rural people had no management system for
their land. It used the term parasitic system
of land usage to describe land use in these
areas.
In the pre-betterment period, management
of the communal range lands in the Maluti
district of the Eastern Cape was character-
ised by herding of livestock, use of beacons
and stone packs to mark areas demarcated
for grazing, strong leadership from the
chiefs and effective collective action among
resource users to ensure sound management
of common property resources (CPRs) -
especially land, range lands and forest
resources.
During the betterment scheme, most of
these characteristics were substituted by
fencing; strong policing from the chiefs
(then used as government tools), the gov-
ernment and its rangers; culling of livestock;
and a centralised form of management.  De
Wet and McAllister (1983) wrote that the
plan during the betterment scheme was to
rehabilitate areas declared for betterment
and to make them economically viable.
This was to be achieved by dividing rural
areas into zones allocated for residential,
arable and grazing purposes.  Officials
charged with monitoring the scheme were
to assess the carrying capacity of the area
and, if necessary, to order culling of stock.
Planning of these areas was based on the
idea of economic units.  These were de-
signed in such a way that a family, in order
to make the minimum of £60 per year that
was perceived as being sufficient to make a
living off the land, should have access to
arable and grazing land.  The units were
expected to comprise 3 morgen (about 2.43
ha) of land and 17 head of cattle, each
requiring 3 morgen (about 2.43 ha) of
grazing land.
De Wet and McAllister (1983) state that in
practice, the economic units could not
support the number of people that were on
the land. Surplus families were therefore
expected to have to move off the land.  In
order for the proposals of the Tomlinson
Commission to be successfully imple-
mented, the rural environment would have
had to be restructured because people
would have to move to newly planned
residential areas so that the rest of the area
could be made available for cultivation and
grazing.  Industries would have had to be
expanded as well, to provide work for those
that would have to move from their old
rural homes to new villages and industrial
areas.  The betterment envisaged by the
Tomlinson Commission was in effect not
implemented, because funding for establish-
ing the new rural villages and industrial
towns was not made available by govern-
ment.  Because the new settlements never
got off the ground, there was nowhere to
move the surplus population.  The idea of
economic units was dropped because the
Tomlinson Commission had reported that
for a black family to make a living from
agriculture they would need an income of
£120 per year.  That would mean that 80%
of the rural families would have to move off
the land. This was not practical because it
would cause social problems, and the figure
of £60 was decided upon instead.
The betterment scheme was resented by
many because of the manner in which it was
introduced.  To compensate for the strong
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arm tactics of the government, the scheme
included attractive agricultural production
initiatives to entice the recipients.  When
the enticement did not seem to be effective,
the authorities resorted to the enforcement
of the scheme.  As part of the scheme,
boundaries were demarcated, fencing was
introduced, and culling and dipping pro-
grammes were implemented.  For more
than 30 years people have learned to live
with the rules and regulations as stipulated
under the betterment scheme.  This has
been their way of living throughout the
years.  Also, direction from rangers, police,
headmen and chiefs is something people
have learned to live with.
Although the manner in which the scheme
was introduced was unacceptable, people
have learned more from the betterment
period than from the new democratic era
with regard to management of communal
range lands.  For many, what this era has
brought is confusion  fences have col-
lapsed, rangers are no longer in place, range
land management is becoming less of a
priority, portions of communal land are
taken by the elite for private use.  Although
many bad things happened because of the
introduction of the betterment scheme,
good things were learned from it too, e.g.
livestock improvements and its benefits,
including wool production.
3.1.2. Purpose
This paper looks at the future of common
property resources with regard to grazing
and livestock production.  In the midst of all
the current complexities (no fencing, no
herding labour, few or no rules, no enabling
political environment, limited space etc.),
what strategies and process could be fol-
lowed to achieve a brighter future for
communal range land management as a
form of common property resource manage-
ment? To help find answers to this question,
evidence is adduced from a case study in
the Maluti district in the Eastern Cape
province of South Africa.
3.1.3. The case study area
As in most of the communal areas in South
Africa, the land history of Maluti District
has been oppressive and conducive to poor
management (Turner, 1999: 6).  The
population of 160,777, according to 1991
figures, was one of the highest of all the
districts in the former homeland area of
Transkei.  According to these figures, the
land area of the district was 221,891hec-
tares, with a population density of 72
people/ km². Table 3  Table 5 show land
use types, estimated potential land use by
type and land use patterns in the district.








Non agricultural land 32,622
Table 3. Land use in Maluti District, 1985







Private Commercial Farming 3,290
Table 4. Estimated potential land use in
Maluti District, 1985





Table 5. Land use patterns in Maluti
District, 1989-1990
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The 1994 livestock figures reveal that the
average area per large stock unit (LSU) was
0.84 ha., the number of LSU per dip tank
was 2,084 and the number of LSU per dam
was 35,431.  There were three dams in the
district (this presumably refers to engi-
neered dams).  The report showed that
there were 106,294 LSU in the district, but
that the appropriate number based on the
recommended carrying capacity was
66,819, which is only 63% of the actual
livestock population in the area. There is no
explanation in the 1994 report of how this
recommended carrying capacity was calcu-
lated.  There are of course many debates
around the issue of carrying capacity, but
the figures quoted show the difference
between conventional scientific recommen-
dations and the actual use of range land by
local stockowners.
According to a study done in the district by
Cousins (1997), people keep livestock for
multiple purposes. 63% keep them for
ploughing, 25% slaughter for meat, 63% use
them for milk, 100% for sales and 25% for
savings and investment.  Reasons for selling
cattle in the area included urgent cash needs
(12%), cash for household consumption
(53%), disposing old and buying in young
(30%), the pursuit of business goals (47%)
and other reasons, e.g. disposing of livestock
by selling to avoid losing them through
stock theft (30%) (ibid., 40).  Goats were
kept mostly for slaughtering and traditional
ceremonies (ibid., 44).
Maluti district is divided into 25 administra-
tive areas, each of which is made up of
wards  which people commonly refer to as
villages.
Management of communal range lands in
the district is a mixture of what people
practised during the betterment scheme, a
little bit of their perceptions of what should
happen, an almost open access situation
and management of the mobility of animals.
There are no forums that sit to stipulate the
rules that should be followed by members.
In most cases, the elite determine what
should happen.  This has become the com-
mon understanding among the users, since it
is also what was practised during the
scheme.
Range land fire, caused by certain individu-
als, is a matter of concern to big livestock
owners.  People disagree on when to burn to
prepare for the next seasons.  Some burn
before the correct time, according to their
individual beliefs about what is best.
Serious clashes have occurred with the
recent emergence of farmers associations.
Because the government appears to support
these, the elite (mainly members of the
farmers association) in one village have
managed to secure one of the communally
managed grazing camps for their private use
(see section 3.3).  The focus of the govern-
ment is now changing towards supporting
those interested in the commercial farming
system, and away from the communal
farming system.  There is a belief among
agricultural extension officers that indig-
enous breeds produce less per hectare than
commercial breeds. Government prefer-
ences are shown by the fact that there is
support for legal entities on land held by
different sub-groups. In this approach,
communal land is subdivided into different
uses by different interest groups.  Although
this has not yet been implemented, it seems
likely that it is the approach most favoured
by the Department of Agriculture in the
district.
In a study I am currently conducting in the
area, I have identified key areas of concern
for successful range management.  In the
next section, these concerns are reviewed
within a guiding theoretical framework
adapted from a paper by Shackleton et al.
(1998: 12-37).




are they met on the Maluti
District range lands?
This section focuses mainly on a synthesised
theoretical framework adapted from
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Shackleton et al. (1998).  This paper uses
their framework to see how it would work
in the Maluti district and makes recommen-
dations relevant to the district.  This frame-
work is seen as relevant in the district
because it addresses issues pertinent to the
success of CPR management.  The way the
betterment scheme was implemented had
shortfalls, which the framework addresses.
Betterment disregarded indigenous knowl-
edge and governance was centralised.  The
framework, if ideally followed, brings in
new ideas about strategies for successful
CPR management.  The betterment
scheme was implemented with the idea that
the government would be at the forefront in
the governance of CPR.  This framework
takes into account most of the concerns that
betterment sought to address, but recog-
nises the role played by the community.
This paper uses the framework to identify
problems and challenges and considers
where the framework can be applicable.
This is not to say that the paper rejects the
framework, but it does suggest ways in
which it can be modified.  The modifica-
tions are based on the realities in the district
and also use arguments of Lawry (1990) on
the role that the state can play in successful
natural resource management.  Lawry
(ibid.: 407) argued that  the modernisa-
tion process itself has reduced incentives for
individuals to participate in localised collec-
tive arrangements, has undercut the eco-
nomic viability of common property institu-
tions, and has reduced the political legiti-
macy of local management authorities.
Population growth and technological change
have increased pressures on natural re-
sources to the extent that minimum com-
mon property rules do not provide effective
regulationLocal common property man-
agement will not emerge simply by giving
greater official rein to local action. He
expressed scepticism about the effective-
ness of autonomous local action in sub-
Saharan Africa.
Not everything from Shackleton et al.s
theoretical framework is used in this study.
Their framework is divided into the follow-
ing:
! nature of the resource;
! characteristics of the resource users;
! institutional issues;




The first three and the last of these six
constructs for successful management of
CPRs seem to be the most pertinent (in
terms of priority) in the Maluti District.
From these four constructs, the theory
adapted from Shackleton et al. is presented
and coupled with evidence from the district
that supports or differs from it.  For each
subsection, concluding remarks are pro-
vided.
3.2.1. Nature of the resource
3.2.1.1. Boundaries
Boundaries must be clear so that users can
know their limits and exclude non-mem-
bers.
In the Maluti district, the boundaries that
are recognised by resource users presently
are those of the betterment scheme.
Although this is true in many villages of the
district, people still regard land of which
they were dispossessed as theirs.  They
collect resources they need whenever they
need them from the areas that once be-
longed to them.  This is risky because the
current owners of these lands regard this as
trespassing.
Also, because there are many ethnic groups
in the district, it is often possible for differ-
ent ethnic groups to neighbour each other.
This poses a threat, since one group can
disregard the regulations set by a neighbour-
ing group to manage range lands.  If live-
stock not belonging to the villages that
constitute a particular area have remained
on the other side of the boundary for a long
time, they are taken to the headman of the
area on which they have trespassed.  After
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a certain period has elapsed, the govern-
ment officers dealing with stock theft are
called to take them away for impoundment.
Although boundaries are clear, they are not
well respected.  Another example, in one of
the villages of Maluti District, is an applica-
tion made by the Hlubi clan for fencing,
although they fear that the Bhaca clan might
cut the fence.
3.2.1.2. Resource size
A resource with small boundaries is easier
to manage than a resource with large
boundaries.
Shackleton et al. (1998: 15) argue that in
situations where the CPR area is large,
considering different use zones may be
useful because rules and regulations would
then vary in strength and stringency de-
pending on the zone.  Their idea was zones
of intensive use as opposed to zones of less
intensive use. What the theory suggests is
practised by the farmers association (see
section 3.3) in the area.  If things were in
their favour, they would subdivide the land
for intensive and less intensive uses.
3.2.1.3. Supply  demand conditions and
dependency on the resource
A high level of dependency on the resource
results in more effective management
structures to manage the resources.
People across South Africa, including Maluti
District, do not focus their livelihood priori-
ties solely on range lands. Social grants, in
the form of old age pensions and disability
grants, are the safety net for households
with elderly people.  These grants have
diverted the focus from effective manage-
ment of land and grazing resources for
sustenance to products sold in market
places.  Lately, very few people recognise
the impact of good management of natural
resources.  People, especially those who
cannot afford herding labour, get almost
nothing from these resources because
livestock theft increases every day.
Lawry (1990) states that because of other
sources of income and the open character
of village economies, the stimulus for
collective action is reduced.  These circum-
stances can lead to competition and not co-
operation in the use of communal resources.
He argues that for a sustained collective
action, the resource in question should be
scarce and of  critical importance to the
economic wellbeing of a large proportion of
the community, and where the transactions
costs associated with collective action are
less than would be the case if resources
were under individual control (Lawry,
1990: 25).
3.2.1.4. Indicators of CPR conditions
Indicators of the condition of the CPR as a
result of regular use are important for CPR
management.  These indicators could be
used to raise awareness among the resource
users of their collective or individual im-
pact.
Although this is important, it depends on
whose indicators count.  Scientists could
come with their technical views of the
situation, and the presentation of their
views could be detrimental or helpful to the
way these resources are used and managed.
Also, the presentation of local views could
be detrimental or useful for range land
condition.  Local knowledge together with
scientific knowledge can produce effective
results with regard to indicators.
A joint effort by users and the government
is needed.  The government must take heed
of things perceived as important by the
users, and the flip side of the equation is
equally true.
To conclude this discussion of the nature of
the resource being managed, I suggest that
if the betterment boundaries could be
reinstated with the support of the govern-
ment, then the problems alluded to above
could be eliminated.  Because of the present
situation, management of livestock mobility
is proving more difficult because there are
no fences.  People are losing their livestock
in big numbers.  This has discouraged many
from livestock farming.
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This almost open access situation also
affects people who use communal range
lands to collect wild resources.  People
relate the current state of these communal
range lands to the unavailability of these
resources for collection. They perceive
communal range lands (except for this year
after heavy rains) as being in a bad state
because some of the resources available
during the betterment scheme are no
longer available. People who depend on
certain communal range lands for survival
often clash with livestock holders for the
resources not to be grazed by livestock.
Harvesters easily achieved their goals when
fences were still in place.
3.2.2. Characteristics of the
resource users
3.2.2.1. User group size
A small user group is more conducive to
successful common property resource man-
agement because the costs of communication
and decision-making are relatively low,
rules are easier to enforce, and social sanc-
tions tend to be more visible and effective.
What the theory fails to state is how small
the number of users must be for successful
common property resource management.
Carney and Farrington (1998) point to the
fact that there should be no more than 30-
40 members for group agreement not to
collapse.  They were looking at criteria for
assessing the strength of local forest man-
agement institutions.
In one village in the district, considered
small by many, range management is domi-
nated by the elite group of the village
(mainly big livestock owners).  They inform
everybody in the village where to graze their
livestock and when.  Although this is under-
stood as a sound communal range land
management effort by many, it is resented
because of the clashes between the elite
(mainly big livestock owners from the
farmers association) and the rest of the
population.
The case study below (section 3.3) shows
the make up of this elite group, from their
establishment to date (see also section
3.2.4.1). The reason this is stated here is
because the government is under the im-
pression that these farmers associations will
benefit users.  As said above, the agricul-
tural extension officers tend to advise
people to farm with commercial breeds only
and to dispose of their indigenous breeds.
They neglect the multiplicity of benefits
derived from indigenous breeds.  The
account given in the case study below shows
the direction that things would go.  This
current trend (of farmers associations)
would come at a cost for other range land
users.  If certain portions of the land within
communal land are to be privatised, then
those using range lands not only for live-
stock grazing but also for harvesting of
various resources would lose.
This happened in one village where one of
the four camps acquired by the association
happens to be rich in wild resources.  The
association is planning to sell the resources
to harvesters.  There are serious implica-
tions emerging from this.  First, the owner-
ship of communal land has passed into
private hands through the approval of
chiefs.  Secondly, the source of livelihood
for other members has been reduced tre-
mendously.  Thirdly, since people are
excluded from the land by the members of
the association, this has created the poten-
tial for conflict.  Lack of information has
resulted in the confused situation alluded to
above.  Members of the association together
with some agricultural officers are partly to
blame.  The confidence of people in agricul-
tural extension officers will be greatly
affected because they reiterate the same
sentiments as those of the farmers associa-
tion.  Their involvement has confused the
situation even more, as people believe that
the association might have legal rights to the
land because government officials are in
support of their actions.
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Carney and Farrington (1998: 17) cite a
case in Namibia where lack of clarity about
the legal status of land has led to semi-legal
fencing of land by the elite.  In South
Africa, Maluti District presents a similar
case, where the elite have used govern-
ments ideas about farmers associations for
their benefit (through land acquisition),
thus excluding other people from land that
is communally owned.
3.2.2.2. Residence
It is preferable for users to reside in close
proximity to, or in the same location as, the
common property resource.
This condition is generally met in Maluti.
People generally live fairly near to the
resource. Although this condition is met, it
obviously is not enough for successful CPR
management. Other factors combine to
overwhelm whatever positive influence this
particular condition may have.
3.2.2.3. Eligibility
Members with ownership and access rights
to CPRs must be defined, and agreed
conditions for eligibility should exist.
This is practised in parts of the district, as
outlined above.  People have invited officers
dealing with livestock theft on several
occasions to impound livestock that belongs
to other areas.  This is not practised in the
district at large, but only in some villages.
The unavailability of fences has necessitated
this practice.
There are known and well recognised big
families in each village.  People gain access
to range land in most cases by being related
to someone or by lying about their clan
names .  They then apply for residence,
which automatically entitles people to
grazing and other rights.  This becomes
difficult with arable fields since they were
reallocated for people who were present
when the betterment scheme was intro-
duced. So newcomers are unlikely to get
access to arable land.
3.2.2.4. Degree of homogeneity
Resource users tend to co-operate better
when they are not strongly divided by
! natural boundaries;
! different perception of risks of long-
term extraction from the CPR;
! cultural antagonisms and
! substantially different exposures to risk
(Shackleton et al. citing Ostrom 1992,
1998: 19)
In most villages around the district there is a
great degree of heterogeneity.  Villages are
highly stratified by social status.  The peo-
ple with the most livestock are the ones
who contribute significantly to the man-
agement of CPRs.  Overall, these conditions
regarding homogeneity are not met in the
Maluti district.
3.2.2.5. Local understanding and
knowledge of resource characteristics
If a CPR is a valuable resource worth the
costs of managing it, the perception that
benefits exceed costs is more likely to arise
when members have relatively full and
accurate information about: (i) the physical
structure of the resource, (ii) the past
actions of other users, and (iii) the relation-
ship of demand to supply.  They also need
to know how the resource varies in space
and time and the impact of use on it.
In Maluti district, people who are vocal
about the characteristics of communal range
lands and how they should or should not be
managed are the few members of the
farmers association. The association (the
elite) considers the voices of other people
with derision.  Although there are valuable
resources in the area, their value is not
considered by many because they are in
great supply.  The supply of trees used as
fuelwood far exceeds the demand.
3.2.2.6. Awareness of resource use issues
awareness of the risk of resource overuse
as well as the relationship between use
behaviour and the state of the resource helps
ensure compliance to resource management
rules.
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Although people have not been educated
about the vulnerability of the resource and
the consequences of overuse, they are aware
of what actions to take to combat the
problem when there is a need.  But their
intended actions are hindered by the una-
vailability of resources.  People are aware
that certain wild resources were in the area
when a particular style of management was
adopted.  The collapse of this style of
management culminated in the depletion of
certain resources, which local people feel is
a sign that productivity is declining.  There
are no mechanisms that can be put in place,
because fencing is needed to revive what
people think of as ideal.
The discussion above has highlighted issues
of concern with regard to the characteristics
of resource users.  The farmers association
in one village believes to know more than
the rest of the population about range
management.  This has created a huge gap
between the two parties.  There have been
rumours that the government supports
actions by the association, but some govern-
ment officials deny this.  The land acquired
by the association for private use has
brought about the feud in the area.  If the
government had created an enabling politi-
cal environment for CPR management,
issues like these could be avoided.  Exten-
sion officers who spend most of their time
in government offices could play a crucial
role in protecting the interests of the
marginalised if they spent more time work-




Security of tenure is important.
There have been proposals that land tenure
reform be piloted in this district. A joint
effort to help people know their rights to
land and be responsible for it would prove
fruitful for many.  If the process is well
administered, effective management of
range land resources and profitable invest-
ment in livestock can be achieved.  The
Proposed Land Rights Management Func-
tions According to the Status of Local
Rights Holders  (seventh draft, July 1998)
might hopefully have brought about good
governance of CPRs when finally promul-
gated.  But this draft proposal has been
shelved (section 3.2.4.3 below).
3.2.3.2. Existing local organisations
Effective CPR management is likely where
resource users have had prior experience.
In the Maluti district, through the assistance
of the Environmental and Development
Agency Trust (EDA), this has not been a
major problem. This NGOs skills have
ensured that community based organisations
are capacitated.  This is not to suggest that
there are perfect institutions in the district
to manage CPRs, but assistance from EDA
ensures some form of co-operation and
competence although the process in many
cases is frustrated by the elite.
3.2.3.3. Centralisation versus decentrali-
sation at a local level
Resource users should not be prevented by
central government from exercising local
initiatives.  Also, a centralised form of
governance at local level (council, executive
committee, traditional authority) is neces-
sary.
It has emerged in Maluti that chaos can
erupt in the absence of a centralised form of
governance of CPRs at provincial and
national levels.  For example, the farmers
association has taken over one of the four
grazing camps in one of the villages and two
of the four reserve camps that belong to six
villages. It is known to everybody that this
might be illegal, but because the govern-
ment has distanced itself from issues of
CPR management, nobody knows for sure
what is going on. Although theory suggests a
centralised body at a local level (meaning
that management functions should be
concentrated and capacitated at the local
level rather than at higher levels), this paper
further suggests that a centralised body at
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government level should also be involved to
protect the interests of the marginalised
among other things.  Centralised bodies at
local level have proved to be biased.  Illegal
land acquisitions by some members of the
villages have gone through these bodies, e.g.
the tribal authority or headman.  Although
their role is a critical one, a complementary
form of management at provincial and
national level is imperative.  This is a policy
question of major concern.  An enabling
policy and political environment for success-
ful CPR management still have to emerge.
3.2.4. Policy issues
3.2.4.1. The characteristics of the legal
and political environment in which the
users reside
The state must protect the rights of people
living on and using CPRs.
The elite in  Maluti district have taken all
range management issues into their hands.
They decide on everything at the expense of
those with no or fewer livestock.  The
acquisition of pieces of land is one factor
that affects those with livestock and those
with no livestock, since the latter also
collected resources from range lands.  Range
lands are up for grabs, with people believ-
ing that governments new approach is for
people to organise themselves into farmers
associations and have legal title to areas they
want to use for farming.
Also, good governance of CPRs at local level
and the support of the government would
ensure the sustainability of range land
resources and related livelihoods in the long
run.  The present chaos prompts many to be
silent about these issues.  Biased headmen
and tribal authorities have discouraged
many from investing in any way in CPRs.
People need a clear-cut position and assur-
ance from the high echelons of government.
This would boost their confidence in the
management of communal range lands.
People need to be assured that all the rules
and regulations they set are going to be
protected by the government and that
information about CPR related issues is well
disseminated
3.2.4.2. Relationship between users and
the state; the role of the state
The state should play a crucial role in CPR
management.
This has been partially alluded to above.
The suggested role of the state and resource
users is co-management of resources, as this
would prove more effective than purely a
decentralised form of governance at local
level or a purely centralised form of govern-
ance at national and provincial levels
(Lawry, 1990).  The government is needed
to ensure that outsiders do not ignore local
initiatives. Lawry argued that co-manage-
ment would be helpful when dealing with
the problem of rule enforcement, especially
when the rules have broad support in the
community.
3.2.4.3. Proposals for land tenure reform
The governments Department of Land
Affairs had been reviewing policy with
regard to land and resource rights and
management in communal areas such as
Maluti District. However, the proposals
that had been developed (including the
Proposed land rights management functions
according to the status of local rights hold-
ers) have been shelved following the ap-
pointment of a new Minister. Nevertheless,
proposals such as those that had been
drafted are needed for successful CPR
management.
The draft proposals identified ten key
functions: internal land use planning, land
use zoning and development, land alloca-
tion, decision making, management and
allocation of funds, investigations of entitle-
ment to legally secure tenure or comparable
redress, accreditation of Land Rights Hold-
ers Structures, registration of land rights,
record keeping and enforcement.
This paper comments on four of these
functions. These are viewed as being issues
of immediate concern with regard to suc-
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cessful management of CPRs, particularly
grazing management.
Land use zoning and development control
If this function were to become operational,
the resource use rules and regulations set by
local people could be protected by a zonal
structure. Under the new municipal demar-
cations, elections and zoning, a representa-
tive of a zone can represent the interests of
his/her constituents at a higher level.  If this
could happen, then people would be as-
sured that their interests with regard to
range lands are protected.
Internal land use planning
This, according to the proposal, would focus
mainly on decision making for communal
resources.
Enforcement
This is the legal and administrative provision
to guarantee rights.
Registration of land rights
Under this provision, people should have
rights as owners or protected rights holders.
3.3. Case Study: the Farmers
Association
3.3.1. History
The history of the Farmers Association
(FA) goes as far back as the late 1980s.  It
started with one person buying a Jersey
cow, which gave him 25 litres a day.  He
bought the cow for $230.  Because he was
concerned that other cattle might injure it,
he went to agricultural officers to ask
permission to graze it in a camp, which
usually was closed most of the year and
opened during winter.  The camp was used
throughout the year to graze commercial
bulls bought with subsidies.  The purpose of
these bulls was to improve stock.  His
request was not accepted, but the officers
advised him to request a piece of land from
the community for private use.  This idea
did not appeal to him because it was not
normal practice for an individual to request
a piece of land from communal range lands
for his commercial cow.  He thought the
community would also turn down his
request since he had never seen communal
range lands being divided into separate
parcels for private use.  He then decided
to lure a couple of people to join him in
requesting the land.
Everybody he approached welcomed the
idea.  They were then advised to request
the land from members of the village.
According to the informant I spoke to,
people in the village welcomed the idea.
They took the matter further to the chief
and he approved their application.  The
application was taken back to the agricul-
tural officers and the magistrate for their
approval.  The agricultural officers sent
their application to a regional office for
approval.  The livestock owners application
was later approved.  In the process of their
application being approved, they affiliated
under the Eastern Cape Emerging Farmers
Union.  They then invited the agricultural
officers to demarcate the land they had
requested.  They were advised on the things
they could do and not do with the land.
When they presented the matter again to
village members, they informed them that
the agricultural officers had advised them
that the Association should comprise 13
members.  They never presented this
information when they first went to the
villagers to request the land.  The idea
behind this was for a few people to be
capacitated, and that the rest of the village
members would then learn from them.
Members of the village received this restric-
tion of membership with bitterness and
expressed this feeling in many ways. Some
grazed their livestock on the piece of land
allocated for commercial breeds, and some
presented their anger about the camp in
meetings.  The camp that is allocated to the
Association is one of the best in the village.
It has a river passing through it and a warm
area that could be suitable for livestock in
winter.
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There is new information about the camp,
which contradicts the report of the Associa-
tion quoted above.  Firstly, it is not only
people who were not part of the process of
handing over the land who are not happy
about it, but also people who were in the
village when the transfer happened.  This
includes some members of the Association
as well.  The Association sees those who
were not part of the process as not progres-
sive.  Recently people decided to graze their
livestock in the fenced camp of the Associa-
tion.  This was at the core of a serious
argument among village members.  This
prompted one Association member to take
away his cow to graze it in better pastures
outside the camp.  Secondly, the Associa-
tion claims that it received the idea that 13
initial members must join from the govern-
ment.  But a government officer has stated
that this claim could not be substantiated in
any way.  They later lifted the restriction on
the number of members to allow anyone
interested to join.  This led to the number
increasing to 21 members.
3.3.2. Achievements
The Association has not achieved much,
except for a few members who own Jersey
cows, bulls and rams.  The production from
the cows is far less than is expected from a
commercial breed. Some people have
complained that the cows are undernour-
ished.  The cows do not belong to the
Association but to a few members.  There
are rams and commercial breed bulls that
members own, which are supposed to be
circulated among Association members.
Buyers of these bulls, when the subsidy was
still in place, would receive 50% subsidy
from the government. When these were
first sold at subsidised prices, the agricul-
tural officers recommended that everyone
in the village should benefit. But when
subsidies were stopped, people chose with
whose livestock they wanted their bulls or
rams to mate.  Because the bulls graze with
other cattle in the village, the village does
benefit to some extent.
The Farmers Association has also estab-
lished a dairy group, and encouraged red
meat producers and woolgrowers to affiliate
under it.  One Association member said that
people are made into puppets by those
holding key positions in the Association
because only one person determines every-
thing that has to be done.  Presently, the
Association is open to everybody, but
members of the village are sceptical about
joining.  Some are not happy with the
procedure followed by the Association to
obtain the land and hence they forcefully
graze their livestock in the camp allocated
for the FA.  Some Association members are
also not happy with the handling of matters
by other members of the Association.  One
Association member complained that they
usually pass him during mating periods.
The rams are supposed to reach each mem-
ber of the Association, now that the subsi-
dies have been stopped, but it is evident
that some members are passed for undis-
closed reasons.
The Association is in the process of dividing
its land.  The agricultural extension officer
in the area has already secured fencing
materials for them.  They know how they
are going to divide the land.  They have
already identified portions within the camp
in which they want to grow feed, a place for
building a milking parlour, and a dam.
Recently, they started to plough feed in one
portion of the camp.  Each of the 21 Asso-
ciation members paid for the tractor that
was used to plough the land.
3.3.3. Vision and dreams
The Association wishes to secure another
piece of land for small stock.  They are in
the process of securing this piece of land.
One member of the Association has already
erected a shack in this piece of land.  Their
vision is to form a wool growers club.  They
also plan to keep their livestock away from
other peoples livestock.  One member
claims that this piece of land is no mans
land.  These two camps that they have
earmarked are reserves for six villages in
Constituting the Commons in the New South Africa
37
time of drought.  Although the process is
still far from being finished, Association
members have already moved their livestock
to this piece of land.  They deny other
people access to it.  They wish to hire
somebody to look after their small stock
when they have secured the land.  Another
idea they have is to use the land they are
claiming productively.  If the restitution
process promptly attends to their applica-
tion, the Association wishes to use the land
to keep commercial bulls for red meat
purposes.  They intend to use land they
have already secured for dairy purposes
only.
The emergence of this Association has
created havoc in the village, as stated above.
Not only did they secure a piece of land
that is owned communally, they also se-
cured land reserved for six other villages
including the one they have acquired land
from.  Also, the restitution claim that the
village is making is in the process of being
hijacked by the Association for its private
benefits.  Their land acquisition stems from
the fact that farmers associations are sup-
ported by the government, as a new trend in
livestock and agricultural production.  This
new trend is not in the interest of every-
body, since the poorest of the poor remain
marginalised.
3.4. Conclusion
This paper argues the importance of recog-
nising the role of government in CPR man-
agement to ensure sustainable livelihoods.
The argument put forth is that the achieve-
ment of a non-freehold future with regard
to CPR management (in particular commu-
nal range lands where livestock grazes and
resources are harvested for sustainable
livelihoods) rests on the availability of the
upper hand (the government).  The gov-
ernment has a duty to protect the rights of
individuals and groups, to police and en-
force rules set by the users.  The situation
presently is chaotic, making most users
unsure of the current developments with
regard to CPR management.  Those with
large numbers of livestock are using this
period of uncertainty to accumulate pieces
of land for private use.  Lack of co-ordina-
tion of government departments partly
causes this corruption.
Many of the other issues discussed above
suggest the potential of fencing to eliminate
threats and problems associated with the
management of communal range lands.
People lose their livestock in big numbers
because of broken fences.  Herding by
children is becoming more difficult since
they spend most of their time in school.
Livelihoods are severely affected in this
present situation.  The position that this
paper takes is that the government should
play its part in overseeing management of
these resources, offer support in terms of
fencing as it did in the past during the
resented betterment scheme, protect the
rights of people, and ensure security of
tenure for sustainable livelihoods.  The past
betterment scheme applied the concept of
creating economic units for people to
sustain themselves. It used a centralised
form of management, which ended up
failing.  This paper proposes a joint effort
between the government and communal
range lands users, following closely the
theoretical framework proposed, to ensure
sustainable livelihoods through livestock
production from well managed range lands.
In this way, a different kind of betterment
can be achieved.
The theoretical framework as used in this
paper would be ideal for the Maluti district.
Generally, the framework can work in the
district, but the internal politics of each
village pose a threat.  Ideally, the frame-
work is good but in each village specific
challenges and problems should be consid-
ered.  These challenges and problems
include the make up of each village: for
example, the capacity of its institutions and
the socio-economic status of individuals
with regard to achieving positive CPR
management.  Everything in the rural
Eastern Cape has been built or developed
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along the infrastructure developed during
the betterment scheme.  It is therefore
imperative that some of the initiatives of
the scheme (like fencing and policing) be
recognised and built into future policy and
practice.
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4.1. Introduction
In the beginning, in Africa, there were the
commons. At least, there were commons
where there were people in sufficient
numbers and with sufficient intensity of
land use to make this form of ownership
and administration worthwhile. These are
the convenient assumptions we like to make
about the history of the continent, and
against which we compare the multiple
dislocations and transformations of the
colonial and post-colonial periods.
These colonial changes in resource access
and ownership found particularly oppressive
form in South Africa, where they culmi-
nated in the apartheid system of racial
discrimination and economic exploitation. It
is still less than a decade since the emerging
democratic society was finally able to start
seeking ways of redressing these injustices.
As probably the best resourced of all colo-
nial systems, the apartheid regime took
nature conservation seriously during the 20th
century. It cleared substantial areas of
human populations so that it could operate
what evolved into a highly professional
network of National Parks and other pro-
tected areas. Nature conservation, and the
ownership of protected nature conservation
areas, now present one set of challenges in
the massive transformations facing South
Africa. These challenges link into a broader
question for the newly democratic nation:
whether the heritage of the African com-
mons can be used in building new dispensa-
tions for owning and managing rural re-
sources.
This paper outlines some of the historical
background to the current status of nature
conservation in South Africa. It then ex-
plores some of the interpretations and
combinations of ownership and the com-
mons that currently influence the status of
nature conservation there. It concludes with
an assessment of whether and how nature
conservation can viably enhance rural liveli-
hoods as a form of common property re-
source management.
4.2. Colonising the commons:
the heritage of nature
conservation in South Africa
The concept of protecting nature is an
ancient one in Africa. It has often been
associated with the spiritual and economic
importance of various wild resources in
African livelihoods. But the idea of setting
aside areas exclusively for nature, regulating
all human access to these areas and banning
all resource extraction from them came to
the continent with colonialism. In South
Africa, as further north, early European
settlers and adventurers slaughtered wildlife
on an unprecedented scale. There is a bitter
irony in the way in which, after wildlife
populations had been decimated, the colo-
nial regime decided to give privileged
treatment to the remaining animals by
creating special protected areas for them.
This commonly involved the forced removal
of local African populations out of the new
nature reserves to resettlement sites else-
where. By regulating access and prohibiting
hunting and other resource use in these areas,
the regime criminalised the indigenous
4. Conserving the commons: nature
conservation as common property resource
management in the new South Africa
Stephen Turner
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African subsistence uses that had posed
no threat to nature before the settlers
arrived.
What followed, through most of the 20th
century, was a history of confrontation
between the rural poor and official nature
conservation authorities. The affected rural
people often viewed the conservation of
nature as one of the most hostile intrusions
by the apartheid regime into their lives.
Arrest and imprisonment for poaching
(inside and outside protected areas) were
common hazards. Besides the police and the
army, nature conservators formed a potent
third armed force. Among the black major-
ity of South Africans, the public legitimacy
of nature conservation  or of any sort of
environmental care  was destroyed by the
conservation strategies of the minority
government.
Meanwhile, rural Africans watched the
growth of tourism by whites in the pro-
tected areas from which they themselves
had been excluded. Recreation by the white
minority in these areas was encouraged.
Indeed, holiday visits to National Parks and
game reserves became an established part of
white South African culture during the
second half of the 20th century. These parks
and reserves were well equipped with
holiday camps and road infrastructure to
offer comfortable recreation to the increas-
ingly urban, affluent and mobile white
population. Meanwhile, subsistence by the
poor black majority in these areas was
prohibited. Under apartheid, they were also
almost totally excluded from any sort of
recreational access to the parks and re-
serves. This further damaged the credibility
of nature conservation and of nature-based
tourism in the eyes of black rural people.
They generally saw that their commons had
been colonised; and that their sustainable
use of wildlife and other natural resources
had been prohibited by a ruling class that
had recently decimated those same re-
sources.
4.3. Contested meanings: owner-
ship and the commons
In the simplest formulations, four categories
of resource ownership are distinguished in a
sort of gradient from lowest to highest value
(IFAD, 1995).  In situations of open access,
there are no property rights and no manage-
ment regime. Originally, these situations
pertained in desert areas of no significant
economic value. More recently, they tend to
represent the breakdown of other manage-
ment regimes. In the original and simple
gradient, the second category is state land:
often vast in extent; of economic value that
may not yet have been realised or exploited;
and subject to low-cost management by
government authorities. The third category
would be areas under common property
resource management systems. These are
typically localised in their spatial coverage;
are operated by the people who live among
and use the resources they manage; and
impose significant transaction costs that are
justified by the economic benefits flowing
from the managed resources. Finally, indi-
vidual tenure regimes apply to resources
whose economic benefit streams justify the
still higher administration costs that such
systems impose.
The reality is nowhere near so simple, of
course. In a particular country or region, the
grossly simplified gradient and categorisa-
tion suggested above is filtered, compli-
cated, contextualised and possibly distorted
beyond recognition by specific political,
social and economic circumstances. This is
certainly true of South Africa. Some of the
key features of the distorted resource
tenure map that has emerged from the
history of colonialism and apartheid are as
follows:
! having asserted control over the entire
national space, the colonial regime
assigned increasing proportions of it to
the individual tenure of whites. Blacks
were relegated to own an ultimate
13% of South Africa, in homelands
where a form of African commons was
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assumed to persist under the adminis-
tration of chiefs who were prepared to
comply with the authorities. While
freehold became the norm for whites
and covered most of the country, this
mode of tenure was almost totally
abolished for blacks;
! in the homelands, the State played
significant roles in the administration of
the commons. For example, chiefs
allocations of residential or arable land
had to be authorised by the magistrate,
with survey and record keeping by the
Department of Agriculture. The De-
partment of Agriculture paid staff to
patrol the communal range lands
(Ntshona, section 3.1.1 above). Most
fundamentally, these commons were
State land in the eyes of national law,
and were the responsibility of a Minis-
ter in the white Cabinet. Clearly, they
were far from being the truly locally
owned and managed assets of common
property theory;
! large areas of conventional State land
were also amassed by the regime, for a
variety of military, economic, adminis-
trative and conservation reasons. In-
deed, some 5% of the South African
territory was allocated to National
Parks and other nature reserves. These
were administered by the National
Parks Board, by provincial conservation
agencies, or by other authorities such as
forestry departments. In almost all
cases, these parks and reserves were
cleared of their human populations
(where they existed) through forced
removals  sometimes to nearby sites,
sometimes to remote places. Some of
these removals were violent. They all
caused long term hardship. In excep-
tional cases, such as Kosi Bay, people
managed to resist removal and re-
mained resident within what were now
protected nature conservation areas;
! in a sense, though, State land used for
nature conservation was perceived by
whites as a kind of commons. As a small
and beleaguered group, the ruling white
South African minority had a more
proprietary interest in State property
than citizens do in more democratic
nations. As recreation in protected
conservation areas became an ingrained
part of their culture and psyche, whites
came to perceive these areas as their
privileged property. As I shall show
below, it was not until the character of
these special commons came to be
challenged that this perception found
cogent expression.
So, for much of the 20th century, there were
ways in which the South African commons
were State land; and there was a sense in
which some State land was a minority
commons. Since the first democratic
government came to power in 1994, much
has started to change. From the perspective
of nature conservation and the commons,
some key features of these changes have
been the following:
! a land reform programme has been
instituted. Under its restitution provi-
sions, people who lost land due to
racially discriminatory law or practice
since 1913 (the date of the first Land
Act) can claim it back. Some of the
67,531 restitution claims submitted
were for land that was seized from
blacks to make nature reserves. A few
of these claims have succeeded. Most
are still in process. The most notable
success so far has been that of the
Makuleke, who have regained their
ownership of the Pafuri area at the
northern tip of the Kruger National
Park. In another component of the land
reform programme, qualified groups
can secure the redistribution of land by
receiving grants with which to buy it on
the open, freehold market. In many of
the restitution and all the redistribution
cases, groups thus become the owners of
freehold property. Externally, each group
sis a single legal person operating within a
private tenure regime. Internally, such
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groups are likely to operate some sort
of common property regime;
! meanwhile, the much more far-reaching
challenges of the tenure reform compo-
nent of the land reform programme
have not been successfully tackled yet.
The former homelands are still, offi-
cially, the property of the Minister of
Land Affairs. On the ground, confusion
reigns about tenure and administrative
arrangements. Chiefs and progressive
groupings often vie for control (Turner,
1999). In some areas, chaos and vio-
lence result. In others, people have
cobbled together workable systems and
have instituted their own land manage-
ment regimes in the absence of any
clear initiative from government;
! for the historical reasons outlined
above, the political legitimacy of nature
conservation as a continuing occupier of
vast expanses of South African natural
resources is now widely challenged. The
nature conservation authorities recog-
nise this. While maintaining their
commitment to the preservation of
biodiversity, they now know that they
cannot preserve protected areas as
islands of privilege in the seas of rural
poverty that surround most National
Parks and nature reserves. Several
strategies have emerged, although it is
too soon to say that they are entirely
coherent:
! in an attempt to foster better relations
with park neighbours, the authorities
are promoting various modes of co-
management of protected areas, with-
out changing the formal ownership
status of these areas. Representatives of
neighbouring populations are invited to
sit on committees that have oversight
over park planning and management,
although day-to-day management is
retained as the responsibility of the
conservation authority staff;
· in related efforts to improve neighbour
relations, conservation authorities are
trying to enhance local peoples liveli-
hoods. Commonly, this involves a
variety of income-generating projects in
nearby areas linked to ecotourism and
the tourist traffic that the parks and
reserves generate. In fewer cases, a
commitment to sustainable use of
protected area resources has emerged in
the policies of conservation authorities.
Many nature conservators remain
opposed to any resource use within
their domains;
! some authorities, most notably the
KwaZulu-Natal Nature Conservation
Service, have tried to build beyond a
sense of commitment and caring for the
protected area among neighbouring
populations. They have urged that local
people feel a sense of ownership of
parks and reserves. Coming full circle,
we now find an attempt to make black
people feel that local State land is now
a kind of commons  a meaning that is
arguably closer to the real meaning of
the term than the former interpretation
by whites across South Africa that
National Parks and nature reserves were
their special commons;
! more radically, South African National
Parks (the former National Parks
Board) is increasing its commitment to
the concept of contractual parks.
These are parks that are not owned by
SANP, but by local people. When the
idea started, the owners were white
farmers who pooled their land to make
a National Park. Now, contractual parks
are being developed with non white
land owners (Reid, 2000). The
Makuleke people, mentioned above,
have agreed with SANP that their
regained Pafuri area will be operated as
a contractual park. Earlier, in 1991,
agreement was reached for establish-
ment of a contractual Richtersveld
National Park. That contract assumes
the people of the Richtersveld villages
to be the owners of the park. Techni-
cally, as this was a homeland for
Coloured people, they were not 
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although they had used the land for
generations. The Minister of Land
Affairs is still the legal owner of the
Richtersveld and the National Park.
Under a special tenure reform law for
the former Coloured homelands,
genuine ownership will shortly be
transferred to local residents. (They are
currently debating what legal entity will
own the land on their behalf.) The
Richtersveld contract, like that for the
Makuleke, allows for sustainable re-
source use by the park owners. In the
case of the Richtersveld, specified stock
owners are allowed to continue grazing
agreed numbers of animals in the park.
So, in recent years, the tenure status and
socio-economic character of National Parks
and nature reserves have been fundamen-
tally challenged. Clearly, the white minority
can no longer regard them as a private
commons. More interestingly, their status
as State land and public assets has been
challenged. Contractual national parks are
owned by local people, although their
contracts allow for biodiversity conservation
in the national interest and local and SANP
economic interests dictate that all South
Africans will be welcome to come and enjoy
them. What about other parks and nature
reserves? Efforts by the KwaZulu-Natal
authorities to foster a local sense of owner-
ship of nature reserves led to indignant
letters to the press by urban whites. The
letter writers asserted that every citizen of
the province had the same ownership rights
over these assets. They contested the right
of the conservation agency to accord
stronger ownership rights to neighbouring
(black) people. This is symptomatic of a
broader challenge for South Africa and
many other countries: how to reconcile local
and national interests in resource manage-
ment. National interests typically want local
people to feel a degree of proprietary
concern for resources of special importance
(such as protected conservation areas), so
that the resources can be better managed.
But if local people assert too strong an
interest  perhaps by challenging the man-
agement or resource use strategies of con-
servation agencies  national authorities
tend to backtrack and assert the status of
the resources as public assets for all the
countrys citizens.
In South Africa, it is too early for any
balance to have been struck. What we have
at present are:
! commons that are being managed by
the State. Technical management of
both the Richtersveld and the Makuleke
contractual parks is done by South
African National Parks. Through a new
joint management structure, the
Makuleke are rapidly asserting real
influence over management decisions,
although staff in the field are still SANP
employees. The much older joint
management structure and process in
the Richtersveld remain ineffective.
SANP still manages the park;
! some attempts to assign a commons
identity to State (provincial) land that is
used for nature conservation  opposed,
as we have seen, by whites who prob-
ably benefited from the previous status
of conservation areas as their special
sort of commons;
! open confrontation between interpreta-
tions of the same land as State and
common property: cases where pro-
tected conservation areas are seen as
such by the State authorities, and seen
as commons by local people. Not
surprisingly, the people of Kosi Bay
have never regarded controls by the
conservation authority over their use of
local resources as legitimate. There have
been decades of hostility over their
poaching of wildlife in the nature
reserve that was created around them
and which they continue to regard as
their communal property. In the
Mkambati nature reserve in the former
Transkei homeland, Kepe (1997) has
documented how neighbouring resi-
dents (removed when the reserve was
Constituting the Commons in the New South Africa
44
formed) contest the legitimacy of
prohibitions against resource extraction.
They know that poaching is illegal. But
that does not make it illegitimate in the
more fundamental value system to
which they subscribe. For them, these
public, protected resources are com-
mon property resources;
! although we typically think in Africa of
common property resource manage-
ment as a local affair, the geography of
apartheid means that people can now
secure restitution of land that is far
from the places to which they were
forcibly removed. The Makuleke have
regained the Pafuri area, and will main-
tain the status of these commons as a
conservation area. They will continue to
live in the place to which they were
removed, some 75 kilometres away;
! again, we typically think in Africa of
common property resource manage-
ment as providing the framework for a
range of economic activities by local
people, using the resources so managed
for purposes that are often subsistence,
or at least not wholly commercial, in
nature. The future of the commons as
nature conservation areas in South
Africa lies elsewhere. The Makuleke are
currently negotiating with major inves-
tors for the construction and operation
of high cost tourist facilities in the
Pafuri area, and for commercial hunting
on the Zimbabwean CAMPFIRE
model. While they intend to manage
some resource extraction by community
members from the area, their economic
plans are dominated by the licensing of
commercial revenue generation. Less
progress has been made in attracting
such investors to the Richtersveld,
partly because of the character and
remoteness of its natural attractions.
But, although community-based
ecotourism enterprises are also ex-
pected to play a role in many people
and parks strategies around South
Africa, private sector investment in the
commons is expected to be the key to
success;
! this has taken South African thinking
beyond the notion of co-management of
the commons into the current fashion-
able acronym  CPPP, or community-
public-private partnerships. There are
two sources for the current drive to-
wards CPPP in the management and
use of community-owned nature con-
servation areas and other aspects of
South African economic development.
The first, not unique to South Africa, is
the backlash against the notion that
communities can take over manage-
ment from the admittedly incompetent
state. Instead, it is argued, the capacity
and resources of the private sector must
be marshalled alongside those of gov-
ernment and local people. The second
motive for CPPP, again reflecting
international tendencies, is that the
state cannot drive economic develop-
ment by itself. Instead, the private
sector must be encouraged to invest in
much of the necessary infrastructure 
attracted by the economic rewards that
it will reap from its parallel investments
in new enterprises. Dressed in contem-
porary South African political clothing,
this is supposed to mean that, in the
underdeveloped former homelands,
communities will own land and natural
resources; the state and the private
sector will co-operate in establishing
the long overdue infrastructure that is
needed to exploit these areas; and the
private sector will invest in ventures
from which both it and local communi-
ties will profit. With specific reference
to nature conservation, this could mean
that protected areas, as locally owned
commons, would become the arena for
CPPP. So far, with the possible excep-
tion of the Makuleke, all this is more
jargon than reality;
! most fundamentally, there are shifts in
the political perception of what and
whose purposes State property serves,
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and how these purposes can or should
be reconciled with local interests in
owning, managing and using such
property as commons. Part of the
context for these shifts is the political,
economic and ecological debate about
how to balance the conservation of
biodiversity with the alleviation of
poverty.
4.4. Nature conservation on
newly gained commons: the
challenges
There are two ways in which rural South
Africans can constitute commons and
dedicate them to nature conservation (with
its accompanying potential for ecotourism
revenue and enhanced livelihoods). The last
two sections of this paper address some of
the prospects and challenges that distin-
guish the two sets of strategies.
Much of the discussion in this paper so far
has dealt with the first way, which is distin-
guished by the clear tenure status of the
affected land. In some cases, people regain
ownership of nature conservation areas that
were taken from them by the apartheid
regime. State land becomes the private
property of the claimant group. In other
cases, such as the Richtersveld, nature
conservation agencies make contracts with
rural people whose ownership of the area is
already clear and uncontested, if not always
legally sound. Through the redistribution
component of the land reform programme,
it is also possible for groups of poor rural
people to use state grants to buy freehold
land. This land could then be dedicated to
nature conservation and ecotourism. Al-
though this strategy is currently popular
with many established commercial farmers,
who see conservation and ecotourism as
more profitable than crops or livestock, very
few land redistribution beneficiaries have
adopted it so far.
Groups of rural people who seek to build or
reconstitute common property resource
management in these ways face some
standard challenges. The boundaries of their
resources may be unusually well defined 
for example, by the fence of the nature
reserve. Physically excluding outsiders may
be correspondingly easy.  But achieving the
social coherence needed for a viable com-
mon property resource management group
is likely to be as difficult as ever. In former
homelands, after many decades of apartheid
disruption, social cohesion is the exception
rather than the rule. There are many obsta-
cles to the agreement of common interests,
strategies and leadership among those
whom development workers and South
African civil servants so glibly call commu-
nities. In recent work on three areas where
rural people are or might be taking over
responsibility for nature conservation (Kosi
Bay, Makuleke and the Richtersveld), I
found that only the famous and exceptional
Makuleke have the sort of social coherence
that constituting and managing the com-
mons require (Turner, 2000). Although well
favoured for some aspects of the task of
owning and co-managing a National Park,
the people of the four widely scattered
villages of the Richtersveld are poorly
equipped in terms of leadership and repre-
sentation and of social and institutional
coherence. Kosi Bay, exceptional in that
people still live inside the protected area, is
in other ways more typical of homeland
social and institutional conditions. People
are marginalised and disempowered. Their
tribal leadership is far from transparent in
its dealings with ecotourism entrepreneurs.
Despite (or perhaps partly because of?)
decades of well-meaning NGO involve-
ment, there is no coherent representative or
management structure with which a conser-
vation or development agency can interact.
Although land restitution claims have
reportedly been filed, their status is unclear
and the protected area remains state prop-
erty. The project for which I was research-
ing these three areas decided that the
challenges in Kosi Bay were insuperable,
and that it should withdraw. It could well
be argued that the problems of Kosi Bay are
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very common across the former home-
lands, and that this is exactly the sort of
place where such projects should redouble
their efforts.
Even if some threshold of social and institu-
tional coherence can be crossed, defining
the membership of owner groups of these
(re)constituted commons, and keeping it
clear, are substantial challenges. The owner
groups that have emerged so far each consti-
tute several thousand people. Apartheid
typically scattered people far and wide.
When a restitution claim now emerges, they
may have to be sought out from distant
cities as authorised claimants. Conversely,
many people may emerge with claims that
they ought to be members of what they
hope will be a lucrative new property-
owning arrangement. These claims have to
be checked. As time goes on, issues of
deaths, marriage and inheritance have to be
registered and adjudicated if the owners of
the commons are to remain identifiable.
Under South Africas new gender sensitive
constitution, the question of womens rights
as owners rightly adds complexity to the
task. The challenges of maintaining accurate
and relatively undisputed membership
records for owner groups will become more
critical when, as is to be hoped, these
groups become the recipients of revenue
from their nature conservation and
ecotourism activities and if they seek to
distribute part or all of this revenue to their
members.
Even when, as in the case of the Makuleke,
the necessary social and institutional coher-
ence are assured, rural South Africans face
major challenges in building the required
capacity for managing nature conservation
and ecotourism on their commons. At least
three kinds of skill are needed: in institu-
tional management; in the many technical
fields of nature conservation; and in the
many economic and business skills of super-
vising or operating ecotourism enterprises.
Much of this capacity challenge can be
summed up with reference to the three key
areas of interaction in which disadvantaged
rural South Africans now need to build the
capacity to operate as their counterparts
equals. They must be able to operate on par
with the technicians in conservation agen-
cies; they must be able to assert and secure
their rights in contacts with government;
and they must be able to negotiate with and
manage the private sector. In all these areas,
if they can secure the funds, they may be
able to use expert advisers to represent
them. But this is only a temporary solution,
and the reliability, competence and trans-
parency of such advisers can certainly not
be taken for granted. The Makuleke have
profited greatly from access to a dedicated
advisory group that has provided many
services free of charge. But not every group
of rural people seeking to manage common
property resources for nature conservation
and ecotourism is likely to be so fortunate.
There is little sign of the needed capacity
being built at present. Again, the Makuleke
are exceptional in having launched their
own training programme for young local
residents in several of the fields just men-
tioned, and securing donor support for it. A
number of other donor-funded initiatives
seek to help build the capacity of previously
disadvantaged people in the three skill
areas. But they are not yet well coordinated
and are certainly too young to have had
much impact.
Another challenge concerns appropriate
institutional formats for common property
resource management. As has been noted,
new commons are being constituted in
South Africa within a framework of free-
hold tenure. Whatever their internal mode
of communal ownership and management,
any such group operates as a single legal
person from the external perspective of
land tenure and administration. As land
reform was launched during the 1990s,
several legal mechanisms for group owner-
ship, such as trusts and not-for-profit com-
panies, already existed. To make better
provision for the special needs of groups
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taking ownership of land through the land
reform programme  especially through
land redistribution  government created
another institutional form: the Communal
Property Association (Macdonald and
LEAP, 2000). The CPA model has been
widely and too uncritically adopted for
group ownership of assets acquired through
land reform. Boilerplate constitutions for
CPAs are available and tend to be applied
with too little variation to allow for groups
individual circumstances. While the CPA
may be an adequate mechanism for the
simple ownership of land, experience is
showing that it is less suitable for the man-
agement of land, resources, money, people
or enterprises  all of which are likely
challenges in the management of nature
conservation and ecotourism as common
property. It is not surprising that so much
remains to be learned and done in this
regard, just six years after the first demo-
cratic government came to power. But the
challenges of designing and capacitating
appropriate institutions for common prop-
erty resource ownership and management in
South Africa should not be underestimated.
A final challenge concerns the legitimacy
and viability of nature conservation and
ecotourism as activities around which to
constitute the commons in South Africa for
the 21st century. Because of its history,
nature conservation currently enjoys little
legitimacy among the rural populations that
it dislocated. The leadership of groups now
seeking to constitute their commons on this
basis must satisfy themselves and their
membership that protecting biodiversity is a
valid central purpose to which they should
dedicate their resources. Their conclusion is
only likely to be positive if they perceive
that they can build economically viable
ecotourism enterprises on the foundations
of nature conservation. Looking at the
highly lucrative private nature conservation
sector in South Africa, with its five star
lodges and US dollar tariffs, it is easy to
assume that nature conservation and
ecotourism on the commons can generate
big money too. This is a dangerous assump-
tion. Community-based ecotourism has
scored more failures than successes around
the world so far, and South Africa is no
exception. The Makuleke are charting a
bolder and probably more promising course
by negotiating directly to licence private
operators to run tourist lodges on their
commons. But their circumstances  con-
venient geography and strong professional
advice  may not be easy for other groups to
emulate. Realism is vital for rural South
Africans seeking to constitute their com-
mons around nature conservation and
ecotourism. While these may be valid and
viable activities, they are likely to be only
one livelihood component among many that
must be built and sustained in the groups




The second way for South Africans to
enhance their livelihoods by constituting
commons for nature conservation is to
dedicate so far unprotected, undesignated
areas of ecological or ecotourism impor-
tance in the former homelands to that
purpose. In theory, this second means of
constituting commons for nature conserva-
tion has much more potential. But it is
distinguished by the current lack of clarity
over the tenure of land in these communal
areas.
Although the challenges of access and
marketing should not be underestimated,
South Africas former homelands are rich in
ecotourism potential. Despite their history
of overcrowding and environmental degra-
dation, they still offer real prospects for the
designation of areas and resources for
environmental care and protection. But,
whatever form of commons we may
imagine to have existed in these regions
before colonialism, no such framework of
institutions and resource management
practice remains now. The former South
African homelands lack a clear land tenure
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framework or administration system. Open
access is the best way to describe the cur-
rent status of resource tenure and manage-
ment. So initiatives to constitute new
commons in such areas for nature conserva-
tion and ecotourism cannot be built into an
existing framework of common property
resource management. They would have to
be constituted as islands of clarified tenure
and intensified administration and manage-
ment in an ungoverned sea of tenure uncer-
tainty.
Although South Africa has gone through
years of debate about the best shape for
land tenure and local government in the
former homelands, there has been very
little discussion so far about how rural
people could set aside, own, or manage
areas of natural importance for conservation
and ecotourism. Moreover, the debate
about tenure reform for these communal
areas has yet to yield clear results. Detailed
legislative proposals drafted over several
years in the late 1990s were set aside when
a new Minister of Land Affairs was ap-
pointed in 1999. Her proposed strategy for
transferring land to tribes is as yet ill
formulated and raises many questions about
the continuing legitimacy of tribes and
chiefs in the modern South Africa. Indeed,
the government has been understandably
slow to confront the challenge of a meaning-
ful policy about chiefs. An area where it has
made more progress has been in the refor-
mulation of local government. But there,
too, policy remains uncertain (due to recent
major reformulations); practice remains
rudimentary; and the appropriate interfaces
with land tenure, land administration and
any form of common property resource
management remain undefined.
In these uncertain circumstances, we can
only speculate that there might be two ways
in which former homeland residents could
work towards nature conservation as com-
mon property resource management.
In the first scenario, people would depend
upon their own institutional ingenuity,
leadership and capacity for self-direction.
This is what the residents of some commu-
nal areas are already doing. Although years
have elapsed since the democratic govern-
ment was installed, they see no policy or
laws coming from that government with
regard to land tenure and administration. So
they work something out for themselves.
Where local politics permit, some consen-
sual and functional land and resource man-
agement arrangements have emerged. In a
similar way, it may be possible for locally
legitimate groupings, leaders and institu-
tions to identify areas for which they will
provide special environmental care and
management and in which they will try to
develop ecotourism. Most of the standard
challenges of common property resource
management would have to be faced by
these groups. The most fundamental chal-
lenge would be to assert and maintain
ownership of  and thus management
control over  these commons in the ab-
sence of any enabling legal framework.
In the second scenario, people would try to
work more within the existing legal frame-
work for nature and natural resource con-
servation. So far, this is just a notion, not
yet tested against the facts of available legal
provision for the former homelands.
(Finding out which laws do and do not
apply in these areas is notoriously difficult.)
The gist of this notion would be that groups
wishing to dedicate areas to nature conser-
vation and ecotourism would have them
designated through the existing, formal legal
mechanisms as nature reserves, forest
reserves, biospheres or some other sort of
protected area for which national or provin-
cial law makes provision. On this legal
foundation they would build management
arrangements that recognise their pre-
eminent role as local owners of the pro-
tected area; that allow for their sustainable
use of resources in the area; and provide for
them to generate ecotourism income there.
Such a strategy would have the advantage of
a more solid legal basis. But sorting out that
legal basis, and getting the relevant govern-
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ment agencies to collaborate in the procla-
mation of protected areas in the former
homelands, might be impossibly complex.
Furthermore, any such protected areas
would still lack the most fundamental part
of the required enabling legal framework 
clear provision for ownership of the land by
the local people.
One quasi-legal mechanism that appears
particularly attractive in this regard is the
conservancy. This is an arrangement be-
tween land owners and government conser-
vation authorities that devolves certain
nature conservation roles and approved
sustainable use benefits to the land owners.
Originally developed in KwaZulu-Natal
with commercial farm owners, it was bor-
rowed in Namibia and developed success-
fully with ranchers there. Later, legislative
amendments in Namibia made it possible
for the conservancy concept to be applied in
the communal areas, giving groups of rural
people the right to manage wildlife and
other natural resources and to profit from
their sustainable use (Turner, 1996). This
proved feasible and beneficial even though
Namibia had not yet developed clear policy
or legislation on land tenure in these com-
munal areas. Now, the conservancy concept
has appeared south of the border again and
is being applied for the first time in a com-
munal area of South Africa. People in the
Richtersveld are discussing the establish-
ment of a conservancy in an area south of
the existing National Park. They expect to
be able to exert management control over
and to reap ecotourism benefits from this
area - even though, again, the way in which
they could own the conservancy has yet to
be legally defined.
I have to conclude that, although various
interesting mechanisms for constituting the
commons for nature conservation and
ecotourism are emerging in South Africa,
the enormous complexities associated with
the early stage of this countrys transforma-
tion make significant progress unlikely in
the short to medium term. In a limited
number of contractual parks, commons
that are formally or informally owned by
local people will be dedicated to nature
conservation and co-managed with nature
conservation agencies. The role of these
agencies in the management of these com-
mons will arguably decrease as the owner
groups gain management capacity. In the
much larger number of conventional pro-
tected areas that are legally owned by the
state, efforts to foster a sense of ownership
among neighbouring people are likely to
remain just forms of words. The authorities
are likely to concede limited amounts of co-
management responsibility to park neigh-
bours, and still more limited amounts of
sustainable use by them. Most of the peo-
ple and parks policy and practice remains
experimental and unformed at this early
stage in South Africas democratic history.
Meanwhile, the biggest challenges to consti-
tuting commons for nature conservation (or
anything else) remain in the former home-
lands, where progress will be extremely
limited until there is clear legal provision for
people to own land and natural resources.
Once again, we must remind ourselves to be
realistic about what nature conservation and
ecotourism can do for rural livelihoods in
even the most promising of legal and insti-
tutional settings. In South Africa so far, the
groups likely to be involved are so big, and
the revenue likely to be generated so com-
paratively modest, that this can never be the
road to riches. But black South Africans
know (and rural white South Africans are
rapidly learning) that it is rarely wise or
feasible to build livelihoods on a single
economic activity. They are likely to be
realistic about nature conservation and
ecotourism being just one strand in a bundle
of livelihood components. Analysts and
policy people must recognise this too, and
try to help ensure that it is at least a strand
that does not snap.
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Community-Based Natural Resource Management
(CBNRM) in Southern Africa
The CBNRM programme sets out to enhance regional research, communication and analysis
of southern African CBNRM issues. It is jointly managed by the Centre for Applied Social
Sciences (CASS) at the University of Zimbabwe and the Programme for Land and Agrarian
Studies (PLAAS), School of Government, University of the Western Cape. Both of these institu-
tions are actively involved in research on natural resource management. Each year key CBNRM
themes are identified by participants within the programme. These themes, as well as others
that arise in the course of further debate, are then subjected to rigorous investigation. Research
reports draw out and disseminate lessons that are relevant to aspects of CBNRM across south-
ern Africa and that may help enhance the standard of living of those who practise it. Compara-
tive analysis and widespread dissemination of lessons for CBNRM are thus distinguishing fea-
tures of the research. Ford Foundation and the International Development Research Centre of
Canada provide funding for the programme.
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